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Mexican dirty wars, the disappearances of thousands, the 1968 Tlatelolco 
Massacre, the 1971 Corpus Christi Massacre, genocidal plans, kidnappings, 
tortures and mass graves: Mexico has a long and well-documented history 
of how it deals with those who rebel, speak out or protest against the 
government. The Zapatistas are a group in the state of Chiapas who decided 
to speak out in defiance. However the fate they received was less harsh then 
those who had gone before them, or since. Why? 
On January 1st 1994, 3,000 Mayan Indian farmers including men, 
women and children became guerrillas and came down from the mountains 
in Chiapas and declared war on the Mexican government. They took several 
municipalities in Chiapas and barricaded themselves in there. The 
government responded by sending in the military, taking back the 
municipalities and trying to restore order. Twelve days later, the fighting 
stopped and a ceasefire was called. Why were the Zapatistas, poor 
indigenous farmers from the most southern state in Mexico, not brutally 
repressed like similar groups before them?  
This paper is a plausibility probe case study analysis of the 
Zapatistas, exploring potential hypotheses as to what caused the 
government’s treatment of them to differ from treatment afforded to other 
rebellions in Mexico. The Zapatista case appears to be a unique one in the 
Mexican context. This paper looks at the causes from different and 
interlinking angles. “Liberation technology”, political culture, historical 
timing and the political situation in Mexico, are all explored. The findings 
show that each aspect had its own crucial role to play, but that there was a 
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definitive role for communication and technology in explaining the 
relatively benign treatment of the Zapatistas. 
Communication and “liberation technology” allowed the Zapatistas 
to highlight their struggle and create a discourse that they were able to 
control. Mexico also has had a complex political relationship and history 
with the United States of America, and this appears to have had a significant 
impact on the treatment of the Zapatista during this period. Mexican 
political culture is strong and complex and has also played a defining role in 
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What causes some rebellions in Mexico to be suppressed and not 
others?  Specifically, why has the Mexican army unexpectedly and 
continually exercised restraint towards a rebel group, the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation (EZLN), known as the Zapatistas? Why did the 
Zapatistas survive the Mexican government’s limited attempts to suppress 
them, and why are they still relevant in today’s world? Mexican authorities 
in the past and during the time of the Zapatistas uprising (at the beginning in 
1994) were very direct and brutal in their suppression of any group that rose 
up or demonstrated against the government. Nevertheless, the Zapatistas 
with significant leadership of a masked philosophy professor, 
Subcomandante Marcos, was not crushed. 
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has ruled Mexico for 
much of the past century. Many dissident groups were silenced during the 
period of PRI domination in Mexico. Some were active before the 
Zapatistas, including the Party of the Poor (Partito de los Pobres), which 
waged warfare against the Mexican government from 1967-1974. Faced 
with massive repression in their state of Guerrero, most of their leaders and 
key members were killed by the Mexican authorities (Bornemann, 2007). 
The Peoples’ Guerrilla Group (Grupo Popular Guerrillero) was another 
group which rose up and was brutally repressed by Mexican authorities in 
1965 (Guzman, 2003). The Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Popular 
Revolucionario) were a group that came about after the Zapatistas, in 1996, 
and while they are still active today, they have faced brutal and sustained 
repression. There were reports that in 2008, for example, that 21 members 
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of this group had gone missing or been kidnapped (Zosimo, 2008). Other 
protest groups have suffered similar repression. (Doyle, 2009; Khasnabish, 
2010) 
The following hypotheses represent possible insights into the apparently 
unique situation of Mexico’s reluctance to fully supress the Zapatista 
rebellion. 
Hypotheses: 
H1:  The Zapatistas and Subcomandante Marcos’ use of the internet and 
media had a significant impact on their ability to survive the repression 
of the Mexican authorities. 
The Zapatistas’ use of the internet and media was thought to have 
had a significant impact on why they were able to survive the repression of 
the Mexican authorities. At the time when the Zapatistas came out of the 
jungle and took the major towns in Chiapas in 1994, the internet was in its 
infancy. Its power and capabilities were relatively unknown and there was 
no real way to suppress or control messages that were sent out through it, 
unlike the sophisticated Internet repression techniques used today, such as 
China’s Great Firewall (Borme & Ye,1997; Roberts, 2018). The Zapatistas 
represented a blank canvas, one without any interference from the 
authorities. The Zapatistas were apparently able to survive because they 
could send out communications from Chiapas to anywhere in the world. The 
global village was aware of the Zapatistas and what was happening to them. 
Authorities were not able to commit the atrocities to other groups they had 
in the past. The global community were aware of them, effectively creating 




H2: The internet presence of Subcomandante Marcos had a significant 
effect on the exercise of restraint by the Mexican authorities. 
Another possible reason why the Zapatistas were able to survive the 
Mexican authorities may have been due to their most visible spokesman, 
Subcomandante Marcos. He appears to have been the key to the Mexican 
authorities’ unwillingness to suppress the Zapatistas.  He was an effective 
figurehead, intelligent, well-spoken and able to captivate audiences. Had the 
support that the Zapatistas received from the global community been less 
enthusiastic, or non-existent, repression might have been more likely. 
Marcos captured an audience through the internet which gave him a 
platform to argue that the Zapatistas were a movement which was worth 
supporting (Khasnabish, 2010).  This appears to have given the Zapatistas 
legitimacy and visibility in the West, and showed that they weren’t just 
another guerrilla group taking up arms.  This point appears to have been a 
crucial one as regards the treatment of the Zapatistas.  Marcos’ leadership 
and apparent decision-making1  to declare unilaterally a cease fire 
agreement with the Mexican authorities in the violent struggle, and instead 
to establish a peaceful and diplomatic front, seems to have been another key 
in the Zapatistas’ survival. If this decision had not been made, the end might 
have been very different. 
H3: The historical period of the Zapatista rebellion is a crucial causal 
factor in the restraint exercised by the Mexican authorities.  
The specific historical period appears to have been crucial to the 
Zapatistas’ survival. They rebelled in 1994 as the world was taking on a 
new political look. The Zapatistas appeared when people in the West were 
                                                          




looking for something new to support; communism had been effectively 
defeated. Marcos’ and the Zapatistas’ idea of the Fourth World War2, a war 
against globalisation, neo-liberal agendas and North Atlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) was something that was already gaining attention 
across the globe. This links to the hypothesis that the support of outside 
influences was crucial to the Zapatistas survival. If the Zapatistas had come 
down from the hills before there was already support building for their 
cause that cause may have been drowned out by other noise that was 
occurring at the time. The timing may have also saved the Zapatistas from 
the full force of the Mexican authorities; the ‘Dirty Wars’3 were over. The 
United States was not as involved in suppressing the left as had been during 
the Cold War (Rabe, 2015). The Zapatistas’ timing, then, may have saved 
them on two accounts. 
H4: The Mexican Government has shown a lack of interest in Chiapas. 
The state of Chiapas had never featured prominently in the context 
of the Mexican political landscape. Chiapas is the southern most of the 
Mexican states, featuring near the bottom on most of socio-economic 
indicators in Mexico. Chiapas was the forgotten state in Mexico and its 
indigenous people there are rightly called the “forgotten people of Mexico” 
(Vidal, 2018). The government was not even aware at what was occurring in 
Chiapas, and of the growth in the Zapatistas’ numbers before the rebellion 
                                                          
2 Marcos referred to the Cold War as the Third World War, so the war in which they are 
currently waging is the “Fourth World War.” (Khasnabish, 2010) 
3 Dirty Wars refers to the Mexican theatre of the Cold War, an internal conflict between 
the Mexican PRI-ruled government, backed by the US, and left-wing student and 
guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 1970s under the presidencies of Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz, Luis Echeverría and José López Portillo (Doyle, 2003). 
5 
 
commenced. The Mexican government’s long lack of interest in Chiapas 
related to the low interest in spending too much time or resources in 
supressing the rebellion there. 
H5: The Zapatistas’ use of masks triggered a cultural sensitivity that 
appears to have affected the Mexican Government and military. 
 
Mexico has very strong cultural beliefs, apparent particularly in its 
many festivals, religious celebrations and day-to-day life. Mayans, the 
predominanat indigenous group in Chiapas, express themselves and their 
beliefs through rituals involving masks. As Octavio Paz emphasized, a key 
part of Mexican culture is the use of masks, and a fascination with death, 
and with the dead (Paz, 1961). The Zapatistas’ use of masks in their 
uniforms and their public dialogues may have struck a cultural weakness in 
Mexico’s government and army, and led to a more benign response 
H6: The Salinas and Zedillo governments did not want international 
condemnation from the repression of another group. 
The government of president Carlos Salinas de Gortari had plans set 
in place for the reshaping of Mexico by the end of his term in office.  This 
focused heavily on NAFTA and dealings with the International community. 
The Salinas administration did not want international condemnation 
stemming from a brutal repression to hinder their chances of concluding 
NAFTA or any other international relationships.  
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León’s administration, which followed the 
Salinas government, faced pressures and international criticism after a 
severe crisis in the Mexican currency, the so-called “peso crisis”. With the 
bailout that Mexico received from the United States, there was the added 
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pressure placed on Mexico’s human rights record. The Zedillo 
administration did not want international condemnation based on brutal 
repression at this point, and thus faced building pressures to solve the 
Zapatistas problem peacefully. 
H7: The Zapatistas were treated differently because of Mexico’s 
preferential treatment of elites. 
Mexico has a vast history of corruption and preferential treatment of 
elites, especially when compared to the poor and indigenous. The Zapatistas 
were essentially led by Subcomandante Marcos, who has been tied to a 
family with connections to the PRI party, and with a background that would 
class him as an elite. There are many reports that this is, in fact, the case, 
and Marcos has never denied it. Marcos’ heritage, and Mexico’s lengthy 
history of preferential treatment of elites could have been a determining 
factor in the overall treatment of the Zapatistas. There is no evidence to 
suggest that other groups rebelling against the government were led by 
members of the elite. This stark point of difference as to the Zapatistas 
compared to other groups is significant. 
H8: The Zapatistas were a low priority for the Mexican Governments 
following the 1994 uprising. 
Since January 1, 1994, the publicity surrounding the Zapatista 
movement has been superseded by more important events in the Mexican 
and global context. Since that initial uprising in 1994, when the Zapatistas 
gained their prominence, there have been different presidents and 
governments that have all had more pressing issues to contend with than the 
Zapatistas. Salinas and Zedillo initially had the Zapatistas higher in their 
priorities; there were bigger issues that faced their governments. When Fox, 
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Calderon and Pena Nieto were in power, they faced perhaps what is 
Mexico’s biggest issue in years, the Drug War, and this took priority over 
the Zapatistas. The Zapatistas thus increasingly took a back seat.  
Background to the Revolt: 
On January 1, 1994, in the southeast corner of Mexico, in the state of 
Chiapas, an army of indigenous Mayan peasants calling themselves the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation rose up and declared war against the 
Mexican government and its 500 years of “colonialism, imperialism, 
genocide, racism and decades of neoliberal capitalism” (Dellacioppa, 2011; 
Cleaver, 1998; Khasnabish, 2008). The Zapatistas released the ‘First 
Declaration from the Lacandon Jungle’ (Khasnabish, 2008). This 
declaration coincided with the signing of NAFTA and demands to end 
structural violence against the indigenous people of Chiapas and a number 
of specific reforms to labour, education, healthcare, land, democracy, 
independence and liberty. The Zapatistas sought an end to neoliberal 
economic reforms, including NAFTA, which they saw as increasingly 
jeopardizing the livelihoods of landless and land-poor peasants throughout 
Mexico by privatizing natural resources and state-run services, lowering the 
social wage and opening the market to foreign trade (Callahan, 2004).  
The Zapatistas started their war by taking over towns and villages 
across Chiapas. The Mexican Army responded by sending in a reported 
30,000-40,000 troops to take back the towns from the estimated 3,000 
Zapatistas. The fighting lasted twelve days and ended up with hundreds of 
causalities. The conflict came to a ceasefire, with both the government and 
the Zapatistas agreeing to negotiations (Washbrook, 2007). This was 
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unexpected, because there have been few examples of such a rapid move to 
negotiations by the Mexican authorities. But what is even more puzzling, 
and what is the main focus of this work, is why even after the talks broke 
down and tensions began to rise, did the Mexican authorities exercise 
restraint when dealing with the Zapatistas. They had not done this sort of 
thing before (Solar, 2014; Callahan, 2004). The Zapatistas were made up of 
indigenous people, subsistence farmers and peasants. This was the same or 
similar group of people who had made up the Popular Revolutionary Army, 
the Party of the Poor, and the Peoples’ Guerrilla Group, all three of which 
were brutally dealt with by the Mexican authorities. So why were the 
Zapatistas different? They were never dealt with in the same way as all the 
other groups in Mexico. Why did the Mexican authorities exercise restraint 
regarding the Zapatistas? 
The Mexican authorities have a long history of political repression, 
one that dates back to the early days of Mexico’s formation as a state 
(Trevizo, 2014; Weintraub, Osorio & Schubiger, 2017). Throughout 
Mexico, during the time of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) first 
unbroken rule 1929-2000 (Daniels-Kolin, 2015), especially during the Cold 
War period, there were several small rural and urban guerrilla movements 
that identified themselves with Marxist-Leninist groups that were 
specifically following foco theory4. Along with these guerrilla groups, there 
were also movements and protests against the PRI by students and working 
class members of Mexican society (Botz, 2014). 
                                                          
a4 Foco is the theory of revolution by way of Guerrilla Warfare, Its central principle is 
that vanguardism by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus 
(in Spanish, foco) for popular discontent against a sitting regime (Childs, 1995). 
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From the 1960s-1980s, Mexico was also part of the Latin American 
‘Dirty Wars’ (Hayden, 2002; Brands, 2010). This was the Mexican theatre 
of the Cold War, in which there was an internal conflict between the PRI 
government, which was backed by the United States, versus the Left Wing 
student and guerrilla groups. During this ‘war’, government forces carried 
out political repression, including disappearances estimated at around 1,200 
people, systematic torture and probable extra-legal executions (Doyle, 2003; 
Karl, 2014; Brands, 2010). The war was characterised by a backlash against 
active student’s movements. Most notably among these was the 1968 
Tlatelolco Massacre, estimated to have killed hundreds of students. The 
military and police surrounded and opened fire on around 10,000 students 
who had gathered peacefully to protest the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City. 
Not only did the authorities kill the students inside the plaza but there are 
reports that they continued through the night and into the neighbouring 
areas, killing and tortured people in these areas (Borden, 2005; Doyle, 
2003). 
Another significant example of this repression, is the Corpus Christi 
Massacre, in which there was a massacre of students in 1971 by a group of 
para military trained by the CIA, while the Mexican police stood by and 
watched the students being gunned down in the street (Doyle, 2003). 
Even after 1994, when the Zapatistas came to prominence there has 
still been numerous massacres and political repression within Mexico. The 
Mexican authorities even engaged in a 1997 massacre dubbed the Acteal 
Massacre, in which 45 people ranging genders and ages from Acteal 
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Chiapas (where the Zapatistas have strong following) were massacred with 
the intention of ending Zapatista sympathy within the area (Doyle, 2009). 
In another southern state of Mexico, Guerrero, there had been a 
number of uprisings. It has been revealed that Mexican authorities carried 
out a “genocidal plan” of kidnapping, torturing and killing hundreds of 
suspected subversives in the 1970s. In the towns, soldiers rounded up all the 
men and boys, executed some on the spot and detained the others, and then 
used violence, including rape, to drive the rest of the people away, 
according to the report. Most of those detained, suffered torture, including 
beatings, electric shock and being forced to drink gasoline. These military 
installations that were created in the areas were operated like “concentration 
camps” (Thompson, 2006). According to a Mexican prosecutor’s report: 
With this operation, a state policy was established in which all the 
authorities connected to the army -- the president, ministers of state, 
and the presidential guard, commanders of the military regions in 
Guerrero, and officers and troops in their command -- participated in 
the violations of human rights with the justification of pursuing a 
bad fugitive."  
The report concludes that, “Such an open counter guerrilla strategy could 
not have been possible without the explicit consent and approval of the 
president” (Thompson, 2006). 
These actions took place in a state near to Chiapas, where the 
Zapatistas came from which was roughly 500kms away. These actions were 
directed and executed by the PRI government, which was also in power 
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when the Zapatistas rose to prominence and for the years following that. 
With obvious precedents set by the Mexican authorities on how to deal with 
anyone who didn’t agree with them, why did they not crush the Zapatistas 
so that nobody would have ever heard of them again? They did it to every 
other groups or person who defied them. So why were the Zapatistas a 
special case? 
The Zapatistas have continued their efforts with the Mexican 
government up until today. The Zapatistas’ have evolved their methods 
when dealing with different political parties that have been in power. They 
launched ‘The Other Campaign’ in 2006 as an alternative political process 
to the presidential campaign, and while, constantly facing attacks from 
paramilitary groups in Chiapas and political stalemates in Mexico City. 
However, in 2018, the Zapatistas have continued their ever evolving state, 
and have put forward a political candidate to represent them. Maria de Jesus 
Patricio Martinez was selected as the Zapatistas representative in the general 
election of 2018, even after the Zapatistas had vowed to never venture into 
the presidential politics (Lafuente, 2017).  
Politics as Communication: 
Politics-as-communication is a lens for addressing the perplexing 
question as to why it was, that the Mexican government did not repress the 
Zapatistas.  For G.R. Boynton, politics is “conversations flowing through 
institutionalized channels punctuated by the vote” (Denton & Kuypes, 2008, 
p.4). Communication is the vehicle for political thought, debate and action. 
David Easton, in a ‘system perspective’ of politics and human behaviour, 
demonstrates the role of communication in politics (Denton & Kuypes, 
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2008). Our political systems process a multitude of inputs from our social 
environment which become outputs of political structures, values and 
actions. Communication channels these inputs, structures the outputs, and 
provides feedback from political systems to the environment, according to 
Dan Ninmmo and David Swanson (Denton & Kuypes, 2008). 
In summary, we do not advance a notion of politics that exists apart 
from how it is comprehended. Rather, political communication is a basis for 
politics. Robert Denton and Jim Kuypes (2008) argued that there are general 
characteristics of political communication that exist, which include four 
elements: 
 short term orientation,  
 specific objectives,  
 primarily mediated, and, above all,  
 audience centred. 
 
Politics is based on communication. The central significance of mass media 
and its role in communication is especially crucial in this regard. As Denton 
and Kuypes (2008) argued, political communication is largely mediated 
communication; the mass media both allows for this mediated 
communication to occur, and for unfiltered discourse, and this may be why 
it was that the Zapatistas were able to survive. 
The use of politics-as-communication through Subcomandante 
Marcos, his communications, writings and the internet offering critical 
insight into the Mexican government’s reluctance to use dominant force 
against the Zapatistas. Something that relates very closely and what I 
believe will help me understand the impact and significance of Marcos and 
his work, is according to Mishra (2016), Aristotle’s model of 
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communication. Aristotle developed a linear model of communication for 
oral communication. The model is mainly focused on the speaker and the 
speech, and is broadly divided into five primary elements. Speaker, Speech, 
Occasion, Audience and Effect. Aristotle also mentioned three critical 
elements of a good communicator. These elements are related and reinforce 
each other and are closely related to the five primary elements, which 
Aristotle mentioned regarding the speaker and their speech. They are Ethos, 
Pathos and Logos. Ethos is the characteristic which makes one credible in 
front of the audience (Mishra, 2016). Marcos was effective at this; he was 
one of ‘the people’ (or at least portrayed himself as one). He was not tainted 
as a politician, and was able to survive the Mexican authorities’ attempts to 
discredit him by ‘revealing his true identity’5. Marcos also excelled in 
Pathos, that is: if what is said to the audience matters to them, it will connect 
with them, and then increase the speaker’s credibility. Marcos spoke of a 
struggle/cause that was gaining momentum across the globe. Logos is logic, 
and that people will believe you if they understand what you are speaking 
about. As mentioned, Marcos spoke about a cause that people wanted to 
believe in so the words were logical to them. Therefore, people had no 
questions about becoming involved in the cause. 
Methodology: Flyvbjerg and Case Studies: 
This paper is a case study analysis of the Zapatistas, exploring 
hypotheses on what caused the government’s treatment of them to be 
different from other rebellions in Mexico. Case studies are a common 
                                                          
5 The Mexican government alleges Marcos to be one 'Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente', 




research method in social science, used to develop an in-depth examination 
of a specific phenomenon (Babbie, 2004, 293). Flyvbjerg (2006) 
investigated the five misunderstandings often perceived when looking at 
case studies as a method of research. He argued that if people merely 
operate at a theoretical level, they remain at the beginner’s level of viewing 
the world. Flyvbjerg added that “case knowledge is central to human 
learning.” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.222-223) Researchers who wish to develop, 
need to use context dependent examples in their work. He argued that “case 
studies are particularly well suited to producing context dependent 
knowledge… as learning in the social sciences is possible.” (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, p.224) “The dense case study is more useful for the practitioner and 
more interesting for social theory than either factual “findings” or the high 
level generalizations of theory” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.238). For the reasons 
that Flyvbjerg argued about case studies, I have chosen to use the Zapatistas 
as a case study to investigate why some rebellions are suppressed and not 
others. 
Why have the Mexican authorities’ exercised restraint as regards to 
the Zapatistas? There has not been any other open rebellion in Mexico that 
has received the same treatment. The Mexican government has established a 
benchmark on how to deal with anybody who speaks out, or poses a threat 
to their authority. Yet, they did not follow this when dealing with the 
Zapatistas. There is also the element of the Internet, which was in its infancy 
at the time, and the significant role that it played with the Zapatistas, as well 
as the role communication plays in the domain of politics. These elements 
alone, make this question a very rich and insightful one to look examine. 
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Harry Eckstein (2009), saw case studies as more than a method of 
producing anecdotes. He argued that “sometimes we simply have to keep 
our eyes open and look carefully at individual cases, not in the hope of 
proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something.” (Eckstein, 
2009) Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of 
human affairs. Concrete, context dependent knowledge is, therefore more 
valuable than the vain search for prevalent theories and universals. In the 
study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context dependent 
knowledge, which rules out the possibility for social science to emulate 
natural science in developing epistemic theory which is explaining and 
predictive (Eckstein, 2009). Testing hypothesis relates directly to the 
question of generalizability and in turn, relates to the question of case 
selection. Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information, because 
they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation 
studied. Case studies “are valuable at all stages of theory building, but most 
valuable where the candidate theories are tested” (Eckstein, 2009, p.80). 
Karl Popper describes a term Falsifiability, when if just one 
observation does not fit within a given proposition, then the proposition is 
regarded as false and needs revision or rejection. Popper’s famous example 
was the all swans are white example. Where there was a claim that all swans 
are white. However, since there had been observed to be black swans, that 
claim could no longer be true (Popper, 1959, p.4). The observation of the 
black swan falsifies the statement made about the White Swans and 
becomes significant, as there now becomes more investigation into the black 
and white swans and further theory building. Falsifiability in case studies 
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becomes important, as something that appears to be white on second look, 
can actually be black and lead to a more significant and deeper 
understanding on the subject, according to Popper that statements that are 
not falsifiable are unscientific and you can not claim to truly know (Thomas, 
2017; Popper, 1959).  
This thesis is going to use the Plausibility Probes model of case 
studies, in which the fundamental question leads to the probing of the 
plausibility of hypotheses. Allowing attempts to determine whether the 
hypotheses posed have the validity to be considered for further testing. This 
model is used as an illustrative case study, in the way different hypotheses 
are examined and developing the theoretical argument in a way that will 
allow for further examination if the testing is considered.  
The Mexican Military crushed and repressed everyone who stood 
against them, but the Zapatistas. Why were they so different?  
Literature Review: 
In his work, Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle 
for Democracy, Larry Diamond looks into the potential that the internet, 
blogosphere, social media and the ever growing access that people have to 
these tools through mobile phones. Diamond argued that 
 These electronic tools have provided new, breathtakingly dynamic 
and radically de centralized means for people and organisations to 
communicate and co-operate with one another for political and civic 
ends. (Diamond, 2012, p.9) 
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Diamond repeatedly refers to these as “liberation technology”. Diamond’s 
work is particularly helpful in this thesis; it is a major focus in both the 
hypotheses and questions. The Zapatistas used the Internet, blogosphere and 
social media in their struggle with the Mexican authorities. This allowed the 
Zapatistas to be constant presence in the lives of western communities. The 
Mexican authorities were then forced to exercise restraint against the 
Zapatistas. Diamond’s work provides a strong base for exploring the 
question (Diamond & Plattner, 2012).  
 
In his work, Zapatismo Beyond Borders: New Imaginations of 
Political Possibility, Khasnabish (2008) examined the Zapatistas’ 
movement across the regional and national boundaries of Chiapas, and how 
this movement influenced communities across North America. He also 
examined how the spread of Zapatismo produced new imaginations within 
North America on how the left could succeed. Grassroots organisations 
created a model and a rallying call for members of the anti-globalisation 
movement. 
 These are all very important factors and useful in the work, as they touch 
on the proposed hypothesis and will help address the fundamental question: 
Why did the Mexican authorities show restraint against the Zapatistas? 
Khasnabish refers to ‘The Northern Struggles’ and ‘Northern Histories’, 
discussing in detail how the Zapatistas struck a chord with North American 
activists. His writing includes many interviews of Zapatistas, activists and 
scholars which will prove invaluable in examining the question, helping 
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gain a better insight into the effectiveness the Zapatista had in North 
America. Khasnabish also focuses on the role of Subcomandante Marcos in 
the Zapatistas cause. The arguments and information that Khasnabish 
provides in this book, encapsulates a large part of how the fundamental 
question is addressed (Khasnabish, 2008).  
This Bridge Called Zapatismo (Dellacioppa, 2011) examines the 
impact that the Zapatistas’ political discourse and practice had on 
movements in Mexico, the United States and beyond. She argued that the 
political practices the Zapatistas have used in their struggle created waves in 
grassroots organisations across the globe, particularly in the United States. 
Dellacioppa also seeks to understand the appeal of the Zapatistas among 
activist communities in Mexico and North America. She discusses the 
Zapatistas’ impact on Mexican politics and the global justice movement, as 
well as the Zapatistas’ use of the internet as a tool. These will be useful in 
the exploration of the question.  
However, what Dellacioppa focuses on, and what will hold the most 
importance for this work, is the diffusion of the Zapatistas’ information. She 
refers to Zapatistas’ ideas and political practices, and how they were read 
and rearticulated by communities the world over. Dellacioppa argued that 
the Zapatistas paved a new way for activists. This point is useful in 
answering the proposed hypothesis, as the historical timing of the Zapatistas 
rebellion was a crucial factor in their survival. This book provides 




In his work, The Secret Society, Simmel (1906) argued that the 
secret inspires confidence in its members, and with this comes the 
protection of invisibility. This invisibility goes on to provide protection to 
both the members involved and their actions. Simmel argued that if human 
interaction is “conditioned by the capacity to speak, it is shaped by the 
capacity to be silent.” (Simmel, 1908, p.340) It can control the very essence 
of social relations through the ratio of knowledge to ignorance. The article 
does go on to talk in depth about secrets and the social context that they 
create and the impact that they can have. For use in this thesis, Simmel’s 
argument that secrets provide visibility and protection is a very useful and 
relevant one, and supports other literature that has been used on political 
communication and liberation. Did the PRI lose the power and invisibility 
of secrets when the Zapatistas were speaking out? Is this why the Zapatistas 
were treated differently? Simmel’s argument opens a useful and thought 
provoking avenue to explore within this thesis (Simmel, 1906). 
In this work The Labyrinth of Solitude, Paz (1961) develops the idea 
and the argument Mexican identity is surrounded by a profound feeling of 
solitude. Paz observes that this feeling of solitude is responsible for many of 
the rituals across Mexico and behind the deep psyche of both Mexican man 
and woman. For the purpose of this thesis, focus is placed mostly on the 
chapter regarding Mexican Masks, which examines the behaviour of 
Mexicans and the use of and meaning of masks in their culture. This is 
helpful regarding the idea that Mexican culture has affected the treatment of 
the Zapatistas, and questions if the use of masks and the hiding of their 
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identity played a significant role in why it was that the Zapatistas were 








Tovar (2013) argued that Mexico was an authoritarian state until 2000 
when the country experienced its first real change in power. An analysis of 
authoritarian regimes can be used in a comparative analysis according to 
Susan Kaufman Purcell (1973), and is characterised by three main features:  
1. Limited political pluralism 
2. Low subject mobilization of the population  
3. The predominance of patrimonial ruler ship on the part of a single 
leader or small group (Purcell, 1973, p.30). 
 In the Mexican context, these features are very evident. The most visible 
groups in the regime are organized around labour, agrarian and middle class 
interests. All of these groups are members of, and part of the tri sector of the 
PRI, the party of the regime. These groups are significantly tied to, and 
dependent on the backing of the regime. Low subject mobilization is a 
situation that occurs when political participants possess more ‘subject’ like 
tendencies that ‘participant’. Citizens are mobilized on a temporary basis, in 
a show of support for the decisions of the elite and the regime (Purcell, 
1973; Seligson, 1984; Benton, 2016). All other times, participation is not 
encouraged. Mexico is a good example of this, especially in elections, with 
voter turnout well below the global average often dipping into the low 50% 
of all those eligible to vote (Solijonov, 2016, p.38). The subject nature of 
participants also extends into Congress, with little incentive for congress 
members to speak out or defy the dominant rhetoric, as they need the ‘party’ 
22 
 
to further their political aspirations. Legislative projects sent to the Chamber 
of Deputies by the executive branch often received unanimous approval 
(Purcell, 1973, p.34). Mexico has developed a society that is based on 
interconnecting chains of vertical patron client relationships. The 
government had replaced the old Caudillos, Jefes Politicos, and Caciques 
that had dominated across Latin America, turning these groups into 
representatives that now do the government’s work in the regions (Benton, 
2016). The Zapatistas were a group who mobilized against an authoritarian 
regime in Mexico, so why were they not treated the same way as the others 
who rose up against the regime in Mexico? 
Secrets Provide Protection: 
Secrets provide protection. Exposure of secrets, both those truly 
unknown and those aspects of privacy that are conventionally respected or 
denied recognition, lead to a loss of the autonomy and esteem of the person 
or groups whose secret has been revealed (Simmel, 1906). The Zapatistas 
benefited from the PRI’s loss of secrecy. In the past, dealings with those 
who rose up against them, the PRI were able to repress with the cover of 
secrecy. With the international community only finding out after the fact. 
Secrecy provided the PRI with the protection to act as they wished. Secrets 
provide authoritarian regimes with power and protection. Mexico is firmly 
an authoritarian regime that benefited from secrecy and the protection that it 
provided (Benton, 2016). Barros (2016) argued that authoritarian power 
simultaneously generates motives for autocrats to hide high level politics 
from the glare of publicity. Was the Zapatista’s ability to gain attention from 
the right areas, the reason why they were treated differently? The PRI were 
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not able to have the protection and hide their politics from the public, so 
they changed their method? 
Digital communication is transforming elections, political debate, 
civic advocacy, philanthropy and the structure of the mass media. The 
political arena, in today’s world, is now faster paced and more decentralised 
than it has ever been. It has become more open to commentary and 
competition, as well as more open to new voices and social entrepreneurs. 
Larry Diamond says that, with the arrival and growing use of the internet, 
blogosphere and social media, authoritarian regimes have been exposed and 
challenged. Diamond argued, that this technology is liberating as it can 
“empower individuals, facilitate independent communication and 
mobilization and strengthen an emergent society” (Krieg, 2017, p.108; 
Diamond, 2012) 
Liberation Technology: 
“Liberation technology” is any form of information and 
communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social and 
economic freedom (Diamond, 2012). In this contemporary era, the 
development of technology has made communication readily available 
through the internet. People are able to access it through mobile phones, 
through apps for social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and 
Snapchat. The internet’s decentralized character and ability to reach large 
numbers of people very quickly, is well suited to grassroots organizations 
(Khasnabish, 2010; Diamond, 2012). This is in sharp contrast to radio and 
television, where messages can be very limited in their range, time frames 
and who is controlling the information. Diamond also comments, that 
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“liberation technology” is a two way or even multiway form of 
communication. A user of these forms of technology, can instantly reach 
thousands of followers. The recipients of these messages are also able to, 
with ease, respond or reply to the original message, something that was not 
available with former types of communication. Users of “liberation 
technology” are not just passive recipients, but often become journalists, 
commentators and organisers. (Diamond, 2012) 
“Liberation Technology” also lends itself towards accountability 
technology, as it provides effective and powerful tools for transparency and 
monitoring. How is a state going to effectively suppress or crush a group, 
when the global community knows what is happening and there is 
documented evidence of it occurring? NAFTA opened up channels 
politically and economically for Salinas and Mexico, however it also opened 
up channels socially and politically for the Zapatistas (Khasnabish, 2010). 
With the added attention that Mexico was now generating from North 
America, especially the United States, it also drew the attention of those 
who had a specific interest in the human rights record of Mexico. This 
attention manifested itself into the United States Congress in the form of 
debates, letters and petitions and the steady rise of mentions the Zapatistas, 
EZLN and Subcomdante Marcos received post their 1994 uprising. This is 
easily seen in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 there is a distinct rise in the percentage 
of mentions all of which coincide with 1994 uprising. The exposure that 
Mexico was receiving caught the attention of the international media, who 
were becoming more interested by the day at the activity that was beginning 
at a ground level around Chiapas. This interest in Chiapas meant there were 
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now outside eyes with the ability to disseminate their messages quickly and 
vastly, who were seeing and documenting what was occurring in Chiapas 
first hand. 
Figure 1: Google Ngram Search Result for Zapatista 
 
(Google Ngram Viewer, 2018a). 
Figure 2: Google Ngram Search Result for Chiapas 
 
(Google Ngram Viewer, 2018b). 




(Google Ngram Viewer, 2018c). 
Figure 4: Google Ngram Search Result for Subcomandante Marcos 
 
(Google Ngram Viewer, 2018d). 
Voices of support for the Zapatistas were enabled and accentuated 
by “Liberation Technology”. Due to this growing medium, there started to 
become a growing discourse across the Western Hemisphere. Growing 
numbers of grassroots organisations in the United States and Canada joined 
in, and the internet played its part for the organisations rapidly sharing 
information (Khasnabish, 2010). Due to the nature of the medium in 
question, the anonymity and speed in which it could be used, there was vast 
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and immediate mobilization of support for the Zapatistas that crossed all 
types of social and class boundaries, which had previously been a 
roadblock. This global mobilization, and support for the Zapatistas was not 
only directed at Mexican Embassies, but also towards local governments 
and representatives of government across the Western Hemisphere 
(Ronfeldt, Arquilla, Fuller, & Fuller, 1999). Due to the medium in use, the 
communication that first started the swell of support, quickly enabled 
mobilization in a physical way. This only strengthened the Zapatista’s 
position. Representatives from these mobilized groups were sent to Chiapas 
to help limit the government repression by providing critical scrutiny, 
documenting actions and providing public denouncement of the Mexican 
government’s actions (Cleaver, 2005).  
In the initial part of the uprising, the Mexican government tried to 
restrict and suppress the Zapatistas and isolate them from any support. The 
government adapted the tactic of ideological control of the mass media, 
trying to both limit and disrupt the news of the uprising and the Zapatista’s 
cause (Doyle, 2009). Attempts were also made to portray the movement as a 
threat to the political integrity of Mexico, linking them to having external 
support from Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and even Argentina’s 
Rebel and Guerrilla forces, though without proof. The state controlled the 
vast majority of news media in Mexico during this time, including print, 
television and radio (Doyle, 2004). The attempts failed, firstly because of 
the written communiques that Subcomandante Marcos wrote and the 
interviews by independent journalists that had gathered in Chiapas. This was 
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followed by more detailed reports from observers, which began to circulate 
around the world.  
The use of the internet by the Zapatista’s supporters, as a model of 
communication, meant that they were able to circumvent the blockade that 
the Mexican government were trying to establish instantly spreading the 
message to anyone who wanted to listen. As Adrienne Russell (2005) 
argued, the Zapatistas benefitted from the independence that “Liberation 
Technology” provided. The Zapatista and their supporters had the ability to 
create the rhetoric and myth that surrounds them, and to shift the power 
from the hands of the Mexican elite, controlling the way the discourse was 
spread (Russell, 2005). This became a strategy of resistance for the 
Zapatista’s, they were able to control the discourse about the situation as it 
was fluidly changing around them. This also provided the means for rapid 
dissemination of information that could provide challenges against the 
nation state. Previously, the only challenges that the nation state largely 
faced was either from other States or from ‘above’, that being from 
supranational institutions like United Nations and World Bank (Sinclair, 
2004). The Zapatista’s supporters and their use of the Internet provided a 
challenge from ‘below’ that being, one from advocacy groups, small non-
government organisations and for widespread political mobilization from a 
grassroots level. As well as creating challenges and pressures from other 
nation states which were also political and economic allies with Mexico. 
The Mexican government could effectively control what was being said on 
television, radio or written in the papers, but they couldn’t censor the 
thousands of independent voices that started to speak on the events 
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unfolding in Chiapas. Nor could they control the mounting international 
condemnation or pressures that were starting to grow. The groups 
supporting the Zapatistas used traditional models that were already in 
existence for use in solidarity aid and material aid, moulding them into 
channels that effectively became the nervous system that reached across 
nations that disseminated information on the Zapatistas and Chiapas 
uprising. The Zapatistas benefiting greatly from this communication, 
playing no direct role in the proliferation of communication on the internet. 
This was the efforts of others that wanted to create support for the 
Zapatista’s movement. Shultz (1998) argued that the global interactive 
communication had enabled the Zapatistas to link up with individuals, 
groups and organizations being crucial to the Zapatistas relevance and 
position against the Mexican authorities. 
 “Liberation Technology” allows for mobilization, be it digitally or 
physically. One of the most direct and powerful effects that “liberation 
technology” has. It enables the facilitations of fast, large scale, popular 
movements (Diamond, 2012). Though in the case of the Zapatistas, this 
movement occurred across North American and Western Europe, not in 
Chiapas. It was an effective tool, as the pressure was still placed on the 
Mexican Authorities. Since the Zapatistas use of “liberation technology” for 
this purpose, we have seen numerous examples of “Liberation Technology” 
mobilizing people for change. These included the 2004 Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine which toppled their government, the 2005 Cedar Revolution in 
Lebanon, the 2007 Venezuelan student protests, the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, and the Arab Spring (Diamond, 2016). 
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With the inclusion of “liberation technology” into the modus 
operandi of the Zapatistas, it allowed them to become involved in the 
internal and international circulation of information. The indigenous 
rebellion in Chiapas was now easily and quickly disseminated globally. The 
internet provided the means for information to be spread through pre-
existing circuits that had already been established (Cleaver, 1998). These 
circuits had been established in an effort to block NAFTA and protect Latin 
American and Indigenous rights. These networks were primarily located at 
an international level, and within the computer-rich North American and 
Western European countries. New reports on radio and television were also 
complemented by first hand reports on the internet. These were provided by 
observers who had flooded into Chiapas once they heard what was 
occurring. Analytical commentators were also able to voice their opinions 
quicker and with greater ease with the use of cyberspace (Cleaver, 1998).  
Debates were facilitated, due to the internet and the ever growing grassroots 
reports, and were quickly complemented by the creation of specialized lists, 
conferences and web pages devoted specifically to the Zapatistas and their 
struggle in Chiapas. 
Government is Communication: 
Karl Deutsch (1963), in his work The Nerves of Government, argued 
that government is communication, or at the very least, that government 
may be most profitably studied as though it were communication. Deutsch 
develops some very important aspects of his communication theory. The 
inflow or outflow of information or news from one end to another, or vice 
versa, is not automatic. There is a specific role of human beings, which is 
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the steering and co-ordinating role (Deutsch, 1963, p.182). In any political 
system, there are many channels that information must travel through, 
before it reaches its final destination. Deutsch develops the argument 
further, by stating that the meaning and context of the information 
undergoing change is inevitable. In political systems, news and information 
can be lost or take new or changed forms (Deutsch, 1963, p.254).  
Deutsch’s argument is very relevant in the Zapatistas context. The 
voices of the indigenous people in Mexico have either been passively 
ignored, changed, or silenced for most of the past 500 years. For several 
decades prior to the 1994 uprising, locals in Chiapas largely confined 
themselves to legally recognised vehicles of protest, such as demonstrations 
and petitions (Khasnabish, 2010). The Mexican government responded to 
these actions with limited patronage, creating local instruments of power 
and endless bureaucratic delays. The Mexican government employed the 
aspects of communication that Deutsch described above. It created different 
ways of being able to change, steer and co-ordinate what was being 
communicated by the Zapatistas and other indigenous groups during this 
period. It is easy to control what is being said, as it is happening, though 
lines of communication. 
Something that Deutsch does discuss towards the end of his work, is 
that there are many vehicles which carry information. Some of these are: 
political parties, interest groups and pressure groups. The groups, parties 
and organisations enjoy freedom, as they can work between the people and 
the government, while still maintaining their relationship with both 
(Deutsch, 1963). What Deutsch discusses here becomes particularly relevant 
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as the Zapatistas struggle facilitated a new line of communication, which 
included interest groups and organisations from North America and Western 
Europe. This placed pressure upon the Mexican government to act or react 
to the attention and condemnation they were receiving. “Liberation 
Technology” was crucial to this occurring (Khasnabish, 2010). "No field of 
study has more important implications for our lives in contemporary society 
than that which looks systematically at the process of human 
communication" (Defleur, Kearney& Plax, 1993, p.6-7).  
Cleaver, argued that the evolving computer networks supporting the 
Zapatista’s movement provided the backbone for increasingly global 
opposition to the dominant neo-liberal economic politics of the period. The 
same neo-liberal economic politics that Salinas’ was implementing in 
Mexico in the years leading to the Zapatista’s uprising in 1994, that both 
Salinas and Zedillo continued to implement post uprising (Cleaver, 1998). 
The Zapatista’s supporters made it their strategy to exploit new 
communication technologies to create global relationships. The movement 
encompasses a process for social change, one that is concerned as much 
with social equality, freedom and decision making, as it is with economic 
opportunity and human rights. The diversification and evolving discourse of 
the Zapatista’s struggle allowed them to remain relevant and gain support 
from different avenues of society during the initial phases of the uprising. 
The Zapatistas became an icon of social resistance and an example for 
social change that spoke to those who felt part of, or wanted to do 
something for, all the underrepresented and exploited groups around the 
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world. Subcomandante Marcos’ numerous communications reflect this. 
(Khasnabish, 2010). 
Khasnabish argued that the communications by Subcomandante 
Marcos allowed the Zapatista’s struggle to manifest itself across Northern 
America and Europe, where their support bases would be the strongest 
(Khasnabish, 2008, 2010). As Shirley and Khasnabish both argued, Marcos 
used his political propaganda, storytelling and poetry to charm and fascinate 
Mexicans and subsequently the rest of the world. His communiques kept the 
media attention focused on Chiapas, long after the initial shots of the 
rebellion had fallen quiet. He drafted communiques, giving interviews and 
crafting fables, to keep the Zapatistas in constant relevance in news cycles 
(Shirley, 2001; Khasnabish, 2008).  Marcos also sent letters of solidarity to 
other groups around the world engaging in similar struggles, to create 
relationships with other grassroots organizations. 
Marcos developed into a celebrity figure due to this constant 
attention and soon, dolls completed with his ski mask, poncho and 
bandolier, appeared for sale on the streets throughout Mexico. Marcos 
developed a cult following like that of Guevara or Marx. The media coined 
the phenomenon ‘Marcosmania’ and it led to the vast coverage that Chiapas 
and the Zapatistas enjoyed during this time. Phillip Russell conducted a 
study backing this point up, showing in the Mexican newspaper Proseso 
that Zapatista/Chiapas had 7,371 pages dedicated to them while the looming 
Mexican Election only had 34 pages dedicated to it (Shirley, 2001). 
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The Zapatistas communications allowed for an open, multicultural 
dialogue, and the formation of international alliances to support them. The 
cross national solidarity that had been facilitated by the use of the internet, 
strengthened the Zapatistas. The social network that was created, deepened 
itself into the fabric of the Zapatista’s cause. It was a decentralized struggle 
that allowed and promoted interaction between different groups across the 
social networks online. This enabled vast and instant integration, which 
other forms of media would have not been able to facilitate. The intent of 
this form of communication allowed the grassroots level to promote and 
control the discourse and connections that are being created, effectively 
bypassing the nation state level and their modes of control and censorship.  
Cleaver (1998) continued and argued, that there were three specific 
ways in which the Zapatistas achieved their vast following. Firstly, their 
struggle as an indigenous group seeking to create an alternative space, 
culturally, linguistically and ethnically. Cleaver adds, that this in itself had 
been a successful mode of building networks around the world for other 
groups. Secondly, the environment networks were a strong and well-
resourced one, and the Zapatistas cause and use of the environmental game, 
allowed them to gander the support from this vast network. Finally, there 
was the human rights/women’s rights aspect that the Zapatistas were 
fighting for. Again, this was another very well supported, resourced and vast 
network that supported the Zapatistas cause (Cleaver, 1998).  
Mark Shultz (1998) argued that the Zapatista’s social network was 
one of the key elements for the vast international support. Shultz says, that 
the social network’s capacity had made the Zapatistas less dependent on the 
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internal military organization, which they initially used in their uprising and 
more dependent on the support from the global community (Schultz, 1998). 
Shultz continued, that the globalised interactive communication enabled the 
Zapatistas to linkup with diverse groups and organizations, particularly from 
the western hemisphere which had organized on behalf of the Zapatista’s 
cause (Schultz, 1998). This support had become crucial, as it bolstered the 
Zapatista’s position against the Mexican government. The Zapatista’s 
insurgency can be thought of, and seen as, a new type of transnational, 
social movement, emerging to counter globally defined threats and the 
shrinking of national political space (Schultz, 1998). 
Conclusion: 
Mexico is an authoritarian regime, as with these types of regimes 
they do not want the focus on their actions. Particularly, with regards to 
repression, like that of the Zapatistas in 1994. Secrets provide protection for 
these regimes and the ability to act autonomously and in incognito is crucial 
for them. “Liberation technology” allowed the Zapatistas to circumvent the 
incognito mode of the Mexican government, it provided the Zapatistas the 
ability to create and control their own voices and discourse about the 
situation. Allowing their messages to be spread through the correct channels 
and avoid being silenced by the Mexican authorities. Communication plays 
a defining role in government and politics. Lack of communication, and the 
ability to control your own has a decisive role in the Zapatistas rebellion and 





Chiapas as a State: 
Chiapas is the most backward state in Mexico (Tavanti, 2003, p.45), 
and this perhaps explains why the Mexican government did not pay 
attention to a rebellion taking place there. The State of Chiapas borders the 
country of Guatemala and was originally part of that country until 1824, 
when it joined Mexico. This foundation of the state has mentally affected 
the people in Chiapas, making them feel that the state is not really part of 
Mexico (Collier, Farias, Perez & White, 2000). Chiapas is the poorest state 
in Mexico, with the lowest GDP per capita in Mexico, barely reaching 40% 
of the National Medium. The state has the lowest growth rate 0.2% in GDP 
in Mexico, leading to the ever growing income gap separation from the rest 
of Mexico. Chiapas also has the highest rate of poverty at 74.7%, and 
extreme poverty at 46.7% in Mexico (Levy, Hausmann, Angel, Santos, & 
Flores, 2016). Chiapas has become the forgotten state along Mexico’s 
forgotten southern border. The border is awash with unlawful activities: 
principally migration and drug trafficking. The municipal government lacks 
the control mechanisms and municipal administration to protect the natural 
environment from pollution and degradation and the citizens from the 
degrading of society (Alba, González, Ramírez, & Castillo, 2003; Eche, 
2013). The Mexican government has showed a lack of interest in Chiapas, 




The period the Zapatistas have been active in Chiapas has been 
characterised by the privatization of violence and the ever increasing role it 
is having in Mexican life. The privatization of violence and 
counterinsurgency operations in Chiapas and the rise of paramilitary 
violence is showing the weakness of Mexican Central Government and the 
subsequent contradictions of effective authority (Olney, 2006; Mazzei, 
2007; León, 2011; Romero, 1998). The emergence and rise of paramilitary 
groups can be traced back to the government reforms of Miguel de la 
Madrid and Salinas in the early 1990s (León, 2011; Olney, 2006). These 
reforms created a shared vulnerability among the national hardliners and 
local elites associated with the PRI in Chiapas. The feelings that existed in 
Chiapas among these groups compounded in 1994 when Salinas responded 
to the Zapatistas crisis with a policy of negotiation instead of the desired full 
repression (Mazzei, 2007; León, 2011). 
Seen simply as appeasement to the rebels, Salinas’s stance on this 
fuelled tensions in Chiapas among the local elite and hardliners and led to 
the rallying of paramilitary groups in the region (Doyle, 2004; Mazzei, 
2007). Of the nine active paramilitary groups in the region that the CIA 
have identified, eight have identifiable ties to the PRI and the ninth group is 
made up directly of PRI militants (Doyle, 2004). This identification with the 
PRI allowed the party to enact methods they wanted to use against the 
Zapatistas, but were not able to politically. The paramilitary groups allowed 
the PRI to use a faceless branch of their power in Chiapas (Doyle, 2004; 
León, 2011). There is a long history in Chiapas about using interest groups 
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to protect the way of life and interests of the elites. This was the case with 
the Zapatistas and the Chiapas elite’s use of paramilitary groups. There is a 
tradition of circumventing political institutions with a form of grassroots 
organised violence, such as the White Guards and Mapaches (Mazzei, 
2007). Along with the ill feeling towards Salinas’s negotiation policy, there 
was a feeling of abandonment among the Chiapas elite on the government’s 
behalf. “The lack of government support in the face of the invasions obliged 
us to act” (Mazzei, 2007,p.60; León, 2011; Olney, 2006). The land holders 
and ranchers in Chiapas were funding and recruiting the paramilitary 
groups. Chiapas’s elite structure is similar to many around the world, where 
the political elite are more often than not the economic and social elite 
(León, 2011; Romero, 1998; Mazzei, 2007). These people often interchange 
hats, or wear multiple hats at the same time. The PRI in Chiapas had the 
most to lose as they were economically impacted due to the uprising and 
wanted the social status quo to remain the same. Chiapas has a long history 
of interest groups becoming involved in the preservation of the elite’s 
lifestyle and not a history of military intervention in the region.  
Zedillo’s presidency faced similar political pressures to Salinas’s, 
with Zedillo responding in similar ways to that of his predecessor. However, 
Doyle, in her article released in the National Security Archives, as well as 
by the US Department of Defense and Defense Intelligence Agency cables, 
suggested that there was involvement by both Zedillo and Salinas in their 
support of paramilitary groups and their actions against the Zapatistas 
(Doyle, 2004; Watch, 1997). La Jornada have released several reports 
which describe of authorised presidential support for the paramilitary 
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groups: “by mid-1994 the Mexican Army had presidential authorization to 
establish Military teams responsible for promoting armed groups in the 
troubled areas of Chiapas. Assisting personal resisting the EZLN” (Brooks, 
2006; Lopez-Gonzalez, 2008). Both La Jornada and Doyle argued that 
these cables directly contradict the official statements put forward by the 
PRI Presidents (Doyle, 2004; Stewart, 2012). This military support was 
clearly designed to strengthen the paramilitary groups and provoke conflict 
against the Zapatistas and their supporters (Gilbreth & Otero, 2001; 
Johnston, 2000; Berger, 2001), and thus created a social conflict in which 
the military had sufficient legitimacy to use force (Gilbreth & Otero, 2001; 
Johnston, 2000; Berger, 2001). La Jornada described Zedillo’s plans for 
confronting the Zapatistas with the use of paramilitary groups. By the time 
that the PRI had lost power in the 2000 elections it was impossible to 
remove the paramilitary groups from Chiapas: they were firmly in place 
(Bellinghausen, 2007; Marroquin, 2013; Stewart, 2012). 
During the PAN presidencies of Fox and Calderon there was a 
decrease in the PRI-supported paramilitary groups in Chiapas, although, as 
Lydersen (2002) reported, the groups were as strong as ever with increased 
funding and support of the Military in the War on Drugs finding its way to 
the paramilitary groups. Ruben Moreno says the links between the 
paramilitary groups and the government were not as obvious as they had 
been during the PRI presidencies (cited in Lydersen, 2002). The 
paramilitary groups benefitted from government impunity. Both PAN 
Presidents had significant economic development plans for the region. 
Subsequent military spending and presence increased and the paramilitary 
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group’s activity and presence had also increased. Calderon’s use of the 
military was greater than that of Fox’s, and in fact greater than in any period 
in Mexico’s recent history. Neither of the PAN Presidents had specific 
policies for the Zapatistas or even for insuring peace, and were more 
focused on the economic capability of the region and peace and stability 
through the use of the military (Mendez, 2007; Bellinghausen, 2007; 
Marroquin, 2013; Stewart, 2012). 
Low Intensity Conflict: 
The paramilitary groups and the Mexican military engaged in Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC), in which state and non-state actors fought in a 
localised conflict that was below the intensity of a conventional war. It 
involved the use of force applied selectively and with restraint to enforce or 
intimidate (Blank, 1990; Chaudhury, Goel, & Singh, 2006; Searle, 2006; 
Brandolini, 2002).  LICs are limited politico-military struggles geared to 
achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives (Chaudhury, 
Goel, & Singh, 2006; Searle, 2006). LICs are often characterised by 
limitations of tactics and levels of force. They are often protracted and end 
up involving the military diplomatic and economic pressures through 
terrorism.  (Luevano, Lombera & Reygadas, 1995; Rebón, 2001) LICs and 
militancy often have their roots in regions where people are governed by an 
insensitive, unresponsive and/or corrupt administration (Chaudhury, Goel, 
& Singh, 2006). They see the use of militancy as a way of protecting their 
families and way of life.   
In conventional warfare the enemy is clearly defined and aggression 
is channelled unequivocally in their direction. Goals and ambitions are 
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clearly defined and there is strong organisation. LICs, on the other hand, 
often have a lack of overall organisation. The use of selective force and 
sporadic aggression. Goals are loosely defined, if at all (Goel, 1998, 
Kinross, 2007). The Zapatistas included a political and military strategy, 
placing a greater emphasis on political efforts to win hearts and minds, not 
engaging in direct conflict. The Mexican Military also did not engage in 
conventional conflict. With their training from United States in counter 
intelligence (Doyle, 2003,2004), the Mexican Military engaged in LIC and 
employed other such tactics to combat the Zapatistas. The conflict between 
the two groups never reached a conventional warfare level, so the violent 
repression that had occurred in the past was unlikely to occur (Rich, 1997; 
Shirley, 2001; Gott, 1970; Harvey, 1998; Movksitis, 1996).  
Readiness for the Rebellion: 
An aspect that has largely been overlooked, is the lack of 
preparedness of the PRI towards the Zapatistas. This may be a defining 
factor in why the PRI took the actions that they did. When the Zapatistas 
came into the public eye on January 1st 1994, the Mexican government was 
forced to scramble to identify the insurgents. The Salinas administration was 
completely caught off guard. Official sources initially tried to downplay 
what was occurring in Chiapas, deflecting it to being the work of external 
influences trying to destabilize Mexico. The government also blamed 
Central American guerrillas, drug cartels and even the Catholic Church. 
Even when the uprising became apparent, there were still official sources 
attempting to suppress the news. (Doyle, 2004, 2009)  
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Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, the interior minister and former 
governor of Chiapas, initially dismissed the accounts of armed rebels in the 
four towns that the EZLN captured as insignificant. It was only once the 
military barracks in Rancho Nuevo came under attack that there was any 
response by the government (Doyle, 2004; Khasnabish, 2010). This in itself 
is significant as it shows the level of interest in what was happening in 
Chiapas. Mexican political leaders blundered by underestimating the size 
and threat of the Zapatistas and by ignoring the warning signs that had been 
apparent in the region for some time. A public statement was released by an 
opposition congressman, that the army and the interior minister had 
information about an armed movement in Chiapas (Khasnabish, 2010; 
Watch, 1997). In March 1993, there were bodies of two junior officers 
found hacked to pieces and buried in a shallow pit in the Chiapas region. 
This was followed by firefights between military and groups of armed men. 
A Colonel from the 31st Military Zone (the one operating in Chiapas) 
reported that his unit had been conducting reconnaissance missions 
throughout the area in search of insurgent training camps. There had also 
been numerous rumours of guerrillas roaming the countryside. Despite all 
this, there was still a steady stream of denials from government officials 
(Doyle, 2004, 2009).  
As events in Chiapas throughout January 1994 developed, it was 
apparent that the government had been following a specific agenda in 
attempting to cover up the Zapatistas presence. The Mexican government 
did not want anything to impede the upcoming NAFTA vote by the United 
States congress on NAFTA. NAFTA was key to Salinas’s and Zedillo’s 
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revolutionary economic reforms and Mexico could not risk drawing 
attention to potentially destabilizing developments in Chiapas. The 
government were not wanting to acknowledge or engage in Chiapas during 
this time due to the weight the NAFTA vote had on their economic plans 
(Doyle, 2004, p.1; Khasnabish, 2008; Dellacioppa, 2011).  
Salinas and the Military: 
Though the armed forces have been aware of the guerrillas' existence 
in Chiapas, they feel that they have been prevented from eradicating 
them. Eradication efforts would have entailed military operations 
that may have proven politically suicidal for the government. 
(Doyle, 2004) 
  This feeling was represented in the work of their intelligence 
apparatus who gathered inadequate information and strategies on the 
Zapatistas (Wagner & Shultz, 1995). The Chiapas uprising also created a 
unique situation which may have led to the way the Zapatistas were 
handled. The army was caught in a political hurricane. There had been 
reports, relayed by US officials who were in Chiapas during the initial 
period of the uprising, stating that Mexican army officials had been voicing 
displeasure at the ineffectiveness and poorly planned political strategy that 
they were being asked to employ. General Miguel Angel Godinez Bravdo, 
commander of the 31st Military Zone and of the operations in Chiapas, 
invited reporters for an interview during the early stages of the rebellion. 
The General stated that the best way to deal with the Zapatistas would be to 
wipe them out completely. He later retracted, and said he was misquoted 
and that he fully supports the government’s plan of action (Doyle, 2004). 
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There were other areas that showed indicators of discontent among the ranks 
of the military. This included the appointment of the new peace 
commissioner, Camacho Solis who called for the cease-fire and asked for 
the military to withdraw from its positions across Chiapas (Wagner & 
Shultz, 1995; Doyle, 2004, 2009).  
The military had always been looked upon as untouchable. There 
had always been the golden rule of journalism, that anything was open to 
criticism except the President, the Virgin de Guadalupe and the Army 
(Lawson, 2002, p.49). On the few occasions that the army was subject to 
criticism, the president spoke out in their defence. However, the term of 
Salinas brought about the end of this mystical status with Chiapas acting as 
a sort of watershed moment (Wagner & Shultz, 1995). The irregular 
relationship between Salinas and the military started off with a very 
questionable victory in the election by Salinas, the army leader’s organised 
a parade on the day of the inauguration. Salinas also called on the military to 
apprehend a well-armed labour leader, the nation’s leading drug trafficker 
and used pre-emptive measures to prevent a violent strike at a copper mine 
in Northern Mexico. After using the military to get his presidency of to a 
solid start, Salinas fell silent on his defence of the military in the latter part 
of his tenure (Doyle, 2009; Wagner & Shultz, 1995). 
The criticisms and then lack of a presidential defence started to flow 
from 1989. There were reports of officials being involved in high level 
narcotics trafficking, with the president remaining silent and offering no 
defence of those involved. In November 1991, soldiers killed seven federal 
agents in Veracruz. Instead of letting an in-house investigation take place, 
45 
 
Salinas ordered the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH) to 
investigate. As a result five officers were imprisoned. In September 1992, 
the Ministry of Public Education distributed textbooks to public schools 
describing soldiers opening fire on innocent, unarmed students during the 
1968 Tlatelolco massacre. Army leaders took exception and the books were 
removed. However, Salinas never denied the content of truth of the books, 
which angered army officials (Doyle,2004; 2009, p.1).  
The year 1993, saw the public attacks accelerated and the army was 
now defending itself more than ever. It appeared that the democratization 
process that Mexico was experiencing had taken the army as its Vietnam. 
The army’s deteriorating relations with the Catholic Church in Chiapas 
started to receive considerable attention, with the majority of people siding 
with Bishop Ruiz. (Ruiz had stopped the army from searching Indian 
villages and accused army officials in collaborating with the former 
Governor Garrids to jail two priests) (Wagner & Shultz, 1995). Some 
accused the army in playing a role in the assignation of Cardinal Juan Jesus 
Oisadas Ocamop. Others used the incident to criticize what they perceived 
as the army’s ineffectiveness in the national anti-narcotics campaign. 1993 
also saw the 25th anniversary of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre. Many groups 
during this time lobbied for the release of classified documents relating to 
the affair, this was a case of opening new wounds for the army. A 
commission de la Vedad (Truth Commission) comprised of prominent 
citizens and intellectuals (many of whom were students in 1968), was set up 
to investigate the events that unfolded at Tlatelolco. When the report was 
delivered in December 1993, the army again had to defend itself from 
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accusations of complying with the killings, with no word or support from 
Salinas (Wagner & Shultz, 1995; Doyle, 2004, p.1). 
This period leading into the Zapatistas uprising is highly significant 
and may have played a major role in why the Zapatistas were handled the 
way they were. There was a significant breakdown in the relationship 
between the military and the President that had been developing for some 
time and had reached its peak during the end of 1993 (Doyle, 2009, p.1). 
Was the President unwilling to use the army to supress the Zapatistas 
because they could no longer work efficiently together? Would the army 
have even been willing to obey the orders of the president?  
Guerrero vs Chiapas: 
Guerrero is much like Chiapas a poor southern state, with a large 
indigenous population and a similar colonial period history. Guerrero has 
had significant political and military repression from the Mexican 
authorities, though has never received the grace or treatment that the 
Zapatistas have received. Guerrero has a long history of the repression and it 
is still continuing. They had the similar problem of elite hired military 
groups like that of Chiapas, but the people of Guerrero didn’t have the 
attention, focus or coverage that the people of Chiapas received. Some have 
argued that the difference between Guerrero and Chiapas and the difference 
in outcomes is the length and intensity of the military presence in the state 
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Chiapas was a relatively new military 
occupation when the Zapatistas were involved. While Guerrero on the other 
hand had already had long periods of military occupation of the state. The 
argument continues that the international and domestic communities were 
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not fazed by what was occurring in Guerrero as there had been occupation 
and repression for such a long time previously. In comparison to the 
Zapatistas and the Chiapas rebellion receiving plenty of attention from 
domestic and international audiences the world over (McAdam, McCarthy, 
& Zald, 1996; Mazzei, 2007; Miró, 2003). Guerrero never had the economic 
potential or draw that Chiapas was seen as. Having the exposure of the 
events in the international and domestic media severely damaged the 
reputation of the Mexican Army and Government. There was significant 
international condemnation and pressures placed on the Mexican authorities 
for these actions. The same international and domestic markets were 
significantly silent with the daily terror and disappearances in Guerrero 
(Watt & Zepeda, 2012; Solar, 2014; Solano & Gunderson, 2010). As it had 
been such a long occupation, the actions were no longer seen as relevant or 
glamourous as those that was occurring in Chiapas, which was something 
new.  
The Mexican authorities never faced the same pressures and 
condemnation from the media. Without an alternative voice commentating 
on events in the region, the authorities were free to carry out their operations 
in Guerrero with total impunity and control the discourse that was being 
created around the events (Watt & Zepeda, 2012; Solar, 2014). Another 
argument that is posed is that the Zapatistas insurgency was novel. Many 
people in Mexico responded to what occurred in Chiapas saying “here we 
go again, these rebels are part of the old Sandinista-Castorite-Marxist-
Leninist legacy. Is this what we really need for Mexico?” (Fuentes, 1994, 
p.56). The Zapatistas provided the opposite, it was the first post-communist 
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rebellion in Latin America. A rebellion that links transnational and local 
Non-Government Agencies that represent civil society and their interests 
(Ronfeldt, Arquilla, Fuller, & Fuller, 1999; Fuentes, 1994).  
Revolutions: 
The treatment of the Zapatistas was different to other rebellions 
because they never posed that much of a threat to the Mexican government; 
they weren’t a revolutionary force. To compound that, the Army was not in 
such a strong position as they had been in the past (Doyle, 2009). 
Samuel P. Huntington provided a clear and concise definition of a 
revolution and is a benchmark for determining if the Zapatista movement 
was a revolution at all. He said: 
A Revolution is a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in 
the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, 
social structures, leadership and government activity and policies. 
(quoted in Knight, 1990, p.313) 
Huntington described in detail the distinction between revolution and other 
forms of uprisings. The probability of a revolution depends on many factors. 
As a result of using Huntington’s definition in comparison to what 
the Zapatistas wanted to achieve and what outcomes actually eventuated, it 
is clear that the Zapatistas was simply a rural uprising. The Zapatistas did 
have specific goals but they were not trying to change the “dominant values 
and myths of a society” (Knight, 1990, p.179-180). Rather, they were trying 
to change current policies in regard to indigenous peoples and rural farmer’s 
rights to land. The Zapatistas did not try and change or overthrow the 
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leadership or government, if anything, wanted to work outside of these 
parameters and have control over their own populous. Something that 
Huntington’s definition does not cover about revolution, but it very central 
to the Latin American context, is that the Zapatistas did not try and touch 
either of the two longest running institutions within Latin America, the 
Catholic Church and the Military. Any attempted or successful revolution 
that has occurred across history in this area, has featured a restructure or 
attempted restructure of one of these institutions, so it can hardly be classed 
as a revolution if neither of these are touched. The Zapatistas did not 
attempt any change these two institutions, so they didn’t really show the 
intent that was needed to classify them as a revolutionary force.  
The EZLN is comprised of mainly indigenous peasants and farmers, 
which meant they had difficulty in cutting the rural and urban divides and 
the stratification of social classes across Mexico (Dellacioppa, 2011). 
Within Mexico the Zapatistas had been unable to build a broad based, 
popular support in urban or rural areas outside of Chiapas during the initial 
period of their struggle. Theda Skocpol in States and Social Revolutions and 
Barrington Moore in Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy 
provide an excellent framework and analysis to use to analyse the Zapatistas 
situation and their revolution. Moore argued that  
By themselves, the peasants have never been able to accomplish a 
revolution… the peasants have to have leaders from other classes. 
But leadership alone is not enough… for them (revolts) to succeed 
requires a somewhat unusual combination or circumstances that has 
only occurred in modern times… the upper classes have to display a 
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substantial degree of blindness before a revolutionary breakthrough 
becomes feasible (Moore, 1993, p.480). 
Skocpol expanded on this point, by adding that while the peasantry play a 
central role in the revolution, the seizure of power is often carried out by 
“coalitions, alliances or conjunctures of struggles that cut across divides, 
between urban and rural areas, and among different social classes and ethnic 
groupings.” (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989, p.492)  
Using both Moore and Skocpol’s work, we can examine the 
Zapatistas. Skocpol argued that revolution tend to develop broadly based 
coalitions around pre-existing nationalists, populist or religious discourses 
(Skocpol, 1979, p.11). The Zapatista have described themselves as a 
nationalist movement, calling on all Mexicans to fight for democracy and 
control of land in which their hero Emilinao Zapata fought for (Dellacioppa, 
2011). However, this support never eventuated. While the Zapatista have 
drawn state and even worldwide attention, they have been unable to provide 
the ideas, goals or services that would appeal to a broad range of the 
Mexican population. The Zapatista had managed to gain sympathizers 
however, more so than supporters. There have been numerous headlines 
across newspapers and websites about the number of those welcoming the 
Zapatista on their marches. But these sympathy groups didn’t translate into 
the mass support for the Zapatista that Skocpol or Moore suggest is 
necessary to launch a successful revolution (Moore, 1993, p.426 ; Skocpol, 
1979, p.293). The Zapatista, and some of their goals, are specifically 
designed to help only the local Chiapas. Some of these goals are to 
guarantee indigenous rights to land which they believe they are obligated to 
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have. The Zapatista also want Mexico to withdraw from NAFTA because 
the indigenous people in Chiapas will feel the worst effects from the 
agreement. These goals, based upon Skocpols’ theory, will not attract the 
broad based support which is needed for a successful revolution (Skocpol, 
1979). 
Skocpol’s theory also raised the point that a strong regime will not 
leave many social groups outside of their patronage system, which in turn 
leaves very little room for a revolutionary group to build a broad based 
coalition (Skocpol, 1979, p.108). In her book, Mexico in Crisis, Judith Adler 
Hellman described this extensive and effective patronage system in depth. 
She effectively argued that co-optation, is a process in which individuals or 
groups are independent enough to threaten the dominance of a single group 
and are traded small concessions or favours in order to moderate demands to 
concede their challenge. Hellman argued that the PRI in Mexico has worked 
co-optation down to a fine art, and that it has paralyzed almost all potential 
opposition (Hellman, 1978). Relating this back to Skocpol’s point, it would 
be extremely difficult for the Zapatista, who are located in a poor remote 
region of south-west Mexico to organize any other social groupings to form 
a coalition with. Skocpol however, did concede that revolutionary coalitions 
have the best chance for success while facing an exclusionary and repressive 
authoritarian regime (Skocpol, 1979, p.128). Booth and Seligson in The 
Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A Re-examination, 
conclude that Mexico is a universally authoritarian system (Booth, & 
Seligson, 1984). Despite the arguments by Scott (1959) and Tucker (1957) 
that Mexico is a pluralist constitution democracy or democracy in the 
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making, Booth and Seligson (1984) argued that Mexico’s system is largely 
characterised by an authoritarian regime and that it is even linked to the very 
core of national character and psyche of Mexico. 
Goldstone (1991) argued that while in the Mexican context power is 
not concentrated in the hands of one dictator, it is concentrated in the hands 
of one very powerful political party the PRI. Mexico, in this context, is seen 
as having the perfect dictatorship (Goldstone, 1991; Curran & Park, 2000, p. 
86). Mexico’s system incorporates a large bureaucracy and multi-party 
based government. However, since the ruling party had had constant power 
since 1929 with only a 12 year break from 2000-2012, it had committed vast 
and transparent political corruption whenever elections occurred. Whether it 
be local or federal, the PRI had always managed to receive the votes that 
would secure their re-election. Despite obvious and documented cases of 
corruption, the PRI managed to keep the bourgeoisie and elite classes 
satisfied, and managed to co-opt many opposing parties unions and other 
groups (Goldstone, 1991). Goldstone continued to argue that Mexico is in 
no danger of a revolution. A revolution would only occur, if somehow the 
Mexican system developed vulnerabilities within their ‘perfect dictatorship’ 
(Llosa, 1991; Goldstone, 1991; Curran & Park, 2000). Goldstone added that 
a revolution would only occur if their vulnerabilities escalated 
simultaneously, and if the elites started to feel alienated or threatened by the 





Chiapas has been treated differently to most other states in Mexico for long 
periods of time. It is known as the most backward state in Mexico, forgotten 
along the southern border, one of the poorest, with significant birth trauma 
due to the foundation of the state. Chiapas is often only viewed for its 
resources and economic potential by the government. There is strong 
political power among the local elite in Chiapas and a long history of 
paramilitary presence and these paramilitary working on behalf of these 
elites interests. There is evidence which suggests that the Mexican 
government were never aware of the full extent of Zapatistas in the 1994 
uprising or the lead in. The government nor the military were prepared for 
the Zapatistas, that their reluctance to fully engage in warfare with them was 
a sign of this. There also exists the idea that the Zapatistas never posed a 
threat to the Mexican government. The Zapatistas were not a revolutionary 
force, were not going to take over power or be able to gain a broad based 







Mexican Administrations:  
The administration of and goals set by Carlos Salinas, during the initial 
phase of the Zapatistas rebellion, were the reason why the Zapatistas we 
treated differently from all other open rebellions before them and 
subsequently. 
Carlos Salinas came to power in the 1988 Mexican general elections, 
winning 50.7% of the vote, the lowest for a winning president since 1917 
(Noel, 2015). The PRI faced significant opposition during this time from the 
political left, and from other parties on the right. The PRI also faced 
accusations of a fraudulent win in the election, and Salinas faced a great 
deal of public discontent in the early parts of his administration (Nohlen, 
2005). During the 1980s, the PRI went through a series of events that 
significantly weakened their regime, especially a party split in 1987. Salinas 
didn’t want this weakness to become accentuated. His key objective was to 
reconfigure the Mexican political economy and make Mexico a key player 
on the world stage (Blancarte, 1993). He stated in his inauguration speech  
The modernization of Mexico is essential if we are to meet the 
demands of the 85 million Mexicans of today.... In brief, we need to 
modernize politics, the economy, and society. The modernization of 
Mexico is, moreover, an absolute imperative. This is the only w ay 
we will be able to affirm our sovereignty in a world undergoing 
profound transformation. (quoted in Vargas, 1998, p.432) 
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Salinas was desperate for his vision of Mexico to work out and was very 
aware of the process and fallout that could occur during the dual transitional 
change that he wanted to put in place. Citing the Soviet Union as a key 
example, Salinas said  
When you are introducing strong economic reform, you must make 
sure that you build the political consensus around it. If you are at the 
same time introducing additional drastic political reform, you may 
end up with no reform at all. And we want to have reform, not a 
disintegrated country. (Clifton, 2000, p.18)  
This statement introduced Salinas’s intentions on how his government 
would operate and his view on the trade-offs between economic 
liberalization and political democratization. Salinas and his government 
knew that they needed strong political consensus and stability across 
Mexico, in order to achieve the goals that he wanted to achieve 
economically and politically (Clifton, 2000). How did this fit into the 
handling of Zapatistas? 
Mexican Neo-Liberal Policies: 
The Salinas administration’s top priority was the economy. The 
administration expanded their economic model and decided to continue the 
neoliberal polices started by his predecessor, Miguel de la Madrid, for 
whom Salinas had served as Minister of the Budget and Planning 
(Khasnabish, 2008). Believing that the central government’s excessive role 
in the economy was a leading factor in Mexico’s decline, Salinas privatized 
and sold off assets that the previous administrations had been involved in. 
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Although lacking a mandate and even legitimacy, Salinas was determined to 
push forward with a program of reforms. He believed that within a 
generation these reforms would place Mexico among the advanced, 
industrialized nations of the world (Coerver, 2004). The Salinas’ 
government had set out, to establish a set of political and economic reforms 
that were going to change Mexico. The key that Salinas saw in securing 
both his personal and political future and Mexico’s economic future was the 
NAFTA between the United States, Canada and Mexico. Salinas had chosen 
the way that he wanted to go, and his decision was to align and grow closer 
to the United States. The relationship with the USA was the linchpin to the 
economic plan and effectively would signal the success or failure of Salinas’ 
reign (Villarreal, 2008).  
Salinas’s speech and stance on the need for strong political unity and 
economic reform, as well as his alignment with the United States during this 
period, created a unique relationship between the two states. Mexico 
experienced a sort of contradictory relationship with the United States, 
Human Rights groups, and those with Human Rights leanings in power 
based in the United States, condemned the political authoritarianism that 
was being employed at the time in Mexico, while successive US 
governments praised the economic model that Salinas was trying to employ. 
Mexico becoming economically integrated with the US was key to Salinas’s 
economic plan (Rosenblum, 2000).  
The new relationship which Salinas was opening up with the United 
States could be seen as a double edged sword for Mexico. It was bringing 
them the economic situation that Salinas wanted and moving them in the 
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direction that they wanted to go, but it was opening up Mexico and Salinas’s 
administration to a new set of condemning eyes, which had a stronger and 
more powerful voice. The close association with the United States also 
constrained Salinas regime’s manoeuvrability, making political repression 
and corruption much more costly (Steffan, 2007). In the United States 
Congress during January 1994 there was significant debate and concern 
raised by multiple members over the economic impact the Zapatista conflict 
was going to have on the United States and NAFTA, Mexico’s political 
stability and the United States role in developing and aiding Mexico 
(Congress, 1994, p.5-10). In the late 1980s, Amnesty International found 
that Mexico was in the top two countries in the hemisphere with the worst 
human rights violations (Amnesty International, 1995). Human Rights 
Watch published a report titled Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of 
Impunity in 1990 only days before Salinas was to meet President George 
H.W. Bush about NAFTA. There was increased heat being placed on 
Salinas’s human rights record, and the relationship Mexico and the United 
States being discussed in United States during this time (Lutz, 1990). A 
series of petitions and letters were sent to the administration of Salinas 
during January 1994 expressing concern over the Zapatistas conflict, urging 
the Mexican administration to take a different approach and one in 
accordance with Mexican and International law (Congress, 1994, p. 145-
147). 
Salinas, in an effort to keep the United States on side, created the 
CNDH (National Commission of Human Rights) in 1990, a national 
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commission in charge of making human rights recommendations in Mexico 
(Lutz, 1990).  
Presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari: 
Salinas’ presidency can be seen as one of two distinct periods, and 
they both revolve around the NAFTA deal. Salinas started his presidency 
with strong and bold moves. Initially jailing financial elites, one of whom 
was Joaquín Hernández Galicia head of the oil workers union and jailing 
officers of two of Mexico’s leading stock exchanges on charges of security 
fraud (Doyle, 2004). Salinas then filed charges of electoral fraud against the 
PRI mayor of Hermosillo. He jailed the mastermind of the 1984 
assassination of an investigative reporter. He recognised a PAN victory of 
Ernesto Ruffo to become state governor in 1988. Salinas also supported the 
heightened attacks on drug trafficking leading to the arrest of Felix Gallardo 
(Reding, 1989). These moves all created positive early views of Salinas 
from the international community. However, there still remained largely 
negative views from those within Mexico. The Mexican public believed 
they were seeing an elitist technocrat coming into power, by realigning the 
PRI with the private sector and the Mexican right attempting to re-establish 
the obsolete corporatist system from 1946 (Reding, 1989, p.686). The 
Mexican public, and increasingly the global community, began to see that 
Salinas “modernization” was bringing about an increase in the use of 
repression against the population.  Salinas was elevating notorious human 
rights violators to high positions in intelligence and security across Mexico. 
In a show of his intentions, Salinas appointed Gutierrez, Javier Garcia 
Paniagua and Miguel Nazar Haro, who were all leaders of the DFS 
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(Direccion Federal de Seguridad), a Mexican intelligence agency, which 
was accused of illegal detentions, torture, assassinations and forced 
disappearances (Reding, 1989, p.708). At least 347 complaints were 
received by the United Nations which related to Mexican state crimes from 
1960 to 1980 (Castellanos, 2011). He also appointed Fernando Gutierrez 
Barrios, who was in charge of the DFS during this time, to become the 
secretary of government, who would now be in charge of internal security 
and federal elections.  
The second period in Salinas’ administration is encapsulated in 
Zapatista Thunder by Lucy Conger. She argued that “the Zapatistas crisis 
exposed the lack of sensibility among Salinas inner circle of technocrats” 
(Conger, 1994, p.115). Salinas is quoted saying “we focused on the 
economic situation in general and lost sight of the social question.” (Conger, 
1994,p. 115) In the midst of the Zapatista crisis, Salinas attended an 
international financial meeting in Davos Switzerland seeking to reassure 
investors about the situation in Chiapas (Conger, 1994, p.115). During the 
time of the Zapatistas rebellion, Salinas undertook a vast cabinet reshuffle 
that epitomised the direction that he was willing to take, in order for his 
economic plans to take shape. Salinas accepted the resignations from the 
men he had only just appointed and appointed a new cabinet. Camacho Solis 
was named commissioner for Peace, Manuel Tello the Foreign Minister and 
Jorge Carpizo to be the interior ministers. (Doyle, 2004) Salinas also denied 
the CNDH (National Commission of Human Rights) access to Chiapas for 
security reasons. Arturo Sanchez argued that these appointments were a 
very good sign and a shift in Salinas’s position. Carpizo was well known for 
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his sensitivity towards human rights and the plight of the indigenous, while 
Solis was recognized as a negotiator between violent political groups (Scott, 
1994). 
Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon: 
There was an election in August 1994 that the PRI won PRI 
candidate Ernesto Zedillo was elected president. This occurred despite 
threats from the Zapatistas about the resumption of hostilities after a PRI 
victory, and the fact that Marco had been contacted by guerrilla groups 
across Mexico willing to take up arms if the PRI won. As Wagner and 
Shultz (1995) argued this shows that despite the corruption and systematic 
violence that the PRI had waged over their tenure, the Mexican people were 
not ready to risk the instability and unknown that happens with a change. In 
December 1994, Erenesto Zedillo took power in Mexico with the Chiapas 
conflict still hovering over the government, but slowly moving into the 
background (Dávila, 1995). The Zapatista were not as prominent in the 
Mexican minds as they were in early 1994 and were slowly being 
surrounded by the military in Chiapas. Zedillo came under increasing 
pressure to resolve the Zapatistas issue as it was becoming an ongoing 
stalemate. (Dávila, 1995) 
In the early period of Zedillo’s presidency, Mexico experienced the 
Peso Crisis or Tequila Crisis, which occurred due to the large scale reforms 
that Mexico had undertaken since the 1980s and throughout the 1990s 
(Schott, 2005). Mexico was seen by the global community as a risk, due to 
the political violence they had been experiencing. This led to the 
devaluation of the Mexican peso to compensate. Mexico needed foreign 
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investment and the assassination of a presidential candidate and the Chiapas 
uprisings were deterring investment in Mexico. Zedillo’s administration was 
not in a very strong position politically and economically. The United States 
under President Clinton and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
attempted to bail out Mexico from the crisis to the tune of $50 Billion USD 
(Edwards, 1998; Schott, 2005). 
The Zapatistas were able to use this new leverage and bargain new 
peace talks and truces. During this time, Zedillo was under pressure to 
resolve the Zapatistas crisis in an efficient manner, as it was seen as a cancer 
on his presidency. Zedillo convinced himself that he needed to solve the 
issue by any means. Undertaking an offensive against the Zapatistas, Zedillo 
soon faced pressure from members of his own administration about the 
potential charges of human rights violations. President Clinton, US 
Congress and various other organizations weighed in with petitions and 
letters and convinced Zedillo to resolve the issue through negotiation, as 
Zedillo was in no position to ignore these different groups after the peso 
crisis and bailout. (Wagner & Shultz, 1995; Steffan, 2007; Congress, 2014, 
p.120). 
Presidency of Vicente Fox Quesada: 
The election of Vicente Fox of the PAN party in 2000 and the end of 
PRI rule created a great deal of hope and positivity about the Zapatistas 
rebellion, it has essentially weakened the Zapatistas movement. As a large 
factor that drew support for the Zapatistas cause was their rally against 
corruption in Mexico and PRI rule (Vadi, 2001). The Zapatistas represented 
a strong people’s movement from the grassroots that was holding the 
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Mexican Government accountable for their actions. With the election of Fox 
and the end to the PRI, this need for a people’s representation was lessened. 
Fox initially spoke of a new vision for Mexico, a new era and his vision of 
Mexico had surpassed the one that the Zapatistas had developed for the 
Mexican people. Fox’s legitimacy in victory of the election also provided a 
strong case for his support as it was it afforded him trust from the public and 
surpassed the Zapatistas as the new vision of trust, justice and a voice of 
anti-corruption in Mexico. Days after taking office, Fox declared “We’re 
saying goodbye to military logic and embracing political logic. The 
suffering of Mexican Indians is unacceptable. The need to change our policy 
toward these people is obvious.” (quoted in Weiner, 2000) Immediately 
readdressed the issue of the San Andres accords, which had been largely 
ignored by the previous PRI leaders, claiming that he can solve the 
Zapatistas issue in fifteen minutes (Weiner, 2000; Klein, 2001; Lanier, 
2000). 
Vicente Fox faced pressures from the United States about the flow of 
people heading into the US and forcing the maquiladora sector south, also 
facing pressures from the US about the rising violence levels and the drug 
trade that is ever encroaching into the states. Fox also faced increasing 
violence and protest from disgruntled people who were bypassing the 
normal avenues of lobbying and resorting to direct action, across Mexico 
(Wise & Cyphe, 2007; Bacon, 2001).   
Fox was pro-business and pro-free trade, and suggested opening up 
the NAFTA zone into an open market like that of the European Union 
economic zone and proposed the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP), essentially a 
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development plan that encompassed the southern states of Mexico and tied 
into the NAFTA and Central American Free Trade Agreements (Pereira, 
2001; Call, 2007). La Jornada called the PPP is “a counter insurgency 
strategy with a friendlier face” (Lusigna, 2001). The Fox administration was 
beginning to develop with the help of the US a hearts and minds campaign 
to win over the people of Chiapas (Stenzel, 2006), Fox needed to end the 
militarization of the state of Chiapas among other southern states in Mexico 
to complete his ambitions. Oil and Gas Journal reported that “political 
disturbances are more important as an impediment to oil exploration in 
Chiapas than any other geological factor”. (Sanders, 2001) The direction of 
economic policy had a political mirroring to Fox’s policies, which were 
intent on turning Mexico into a modern economic nation that could compete 
on the global markets (Foreign Affairs, 2015). Fox was employing a 
securitization economic policy of Mexico known as the Merida Initiative 
and was fixated on improving and securing ties with the United States 
(Seelke & Finklea, 2017; Pastor & Wise, 2005). The neoliberal approach 
Fox took slowly lead towards social reforms, and opening of the media, 
economic, political and social spheres. There was never any policies enacted 
towards resolving the Chiapas situation nor the Zapatista requests. The only 
intent in Chiapas was to stop the potential for violence in the region as it 
was impacting economically for Fox (Foreign Affairs, 2015; Sanders, 
2001). 
Presidency of Felipe de Jesus Calderon Hinojosa: 
Calderon was elected president in 2006. Like Fox he was a member 
of the centre right PAN party and a Neoliberal enthusiast (Russell, 2016; 
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Castro-Rea, 2017). Calderon during his tenure was faced with increasing 
resistance against his government’s policies. He was active in the use of the 
military, which was at the time subsidised by the US, and implemented his 
Iron Fist rule initially designed against the ever increasing drug trade across 
Mexico. Calderon’s administration decreased the budget for public 
administration and redirected the funds to the military. Public minister’s 
budgets were also cut and reappointed to National Security ventures 
(Wortham, 2013; Stahler-Sholk, 2007). These ventures included beginning 
the war on narco-traffickers and the rise of military power to unprecedented 
levels. Calderon’s administration breaks down into three distinct priorities. 
Combating poverty, creating jobs and improving public security. During 
Calderon’s tenure Mexico faced an increased militarization and increase in 
military checkpoints across the southern and northern states. (Guerrero, 
2013; Schaefer, Bahney, & Riley, 2009).  
Mexico is a weak state, particularly in the border regions, and that 
has been the way since the early 1990s and groups have taken advantage of 
it. (Nava, 2011; Olson & Lee, 2012) Many reports have pointed to the rise 
of the private security sector in Mexico and the levels of corruption that do 
exist (Müller, 2010; Perret, 2013). Arguing that by the time Calderon had 
taken power there had begun a creation of an artificial social conflict that 
was designed to escalate local polarization (Castellanos, 2008; Henck, 
2011). The government laid plans for a legally justified military incursion 
into the Zapatistas regions, and there was the creation of conflict so the 
military could intervene as peacekeepers. There was a reappearance of 
paramilitary groups across Mexico during Calderon’s tenure, and aggression 
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against indigenous, especially Zapatistas rose (Castellanos, 2011). This 
included the return of OPDDIC (Organization for the Defence of Indigenous 
and Peasant Rights), who were responsible for attacks on Zapatista people 
and were trained, funded and arguably joined by the Mexican military in 
these attacks. Due to the military involvement, a large reason the Zapatista 
public were largely unharmed was their lack of retaliation to the attacks. 
The government had a hard time framing the attacks as indigenous fighting 
and a complete attack would have been at significant political cost (Fazio, 
2013; Reyes, 2015). 
Post PRI Mexico in the 2000s was changing. There was a changing 
structural role of the state and the political class occurring across Mexico. 
This was occurring at a time that the Zapatistas were seen as having a break 
with the Mexican political class (Almeyra, 2014; Modonesi, 2014). The 
Zapatistas during this time were largely irrelevant. The Other Campaign 
waged by the Zapatistas had failed. There had been long periods of silence 
from Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista had kept to themselves in 
Chiapas. The Zapatista were slowly becoming politically irrelevant during 
this period, as other issues had started to develop across Mexico that were 
creating attention (Wilson, 2014; Reyes, 2015; Castellanos, 2008). Calderon 
did not release any policy or intent on solving the issue in Chiapas and the 
Zapatistas completely shifted their ideology towards a social movement in 
the way to reinforce their legitimacy (Reyes, 2015). 
Presidency of Enrique Pena Nieto: 
Enrique Pena Nieto, sworn in as president on the 1st of December 
2012, the first member of the PRI to become president since 2000. The 
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Economist (2012) said that this return to power by the PRI came due to the 
inability to create and real change or progress by the two of PAN Presidents, 
the monopolies and poverty still remained. There was no real choice from 
the left and Pena Nieto seemed to be the least bad option for Mexican voters 
(Economist, 2012; Jespersen, 2013). Before assuming office as President 
Pena Nieto was governor of the State of Mexico, where he did achieve 
success with the infrastructure that he was able to build and keep promises 
that he made. However under his watch the murder rate and violence in the 
state was still at a high level. (Economist, 2011). Pena Nieto promised great 
economic policies that would improve Mexico and made it a global player, 
as well as strengthen ties with the US, though there was the continued issue 
of the drug trade and the levels of murders and violence that plagued 
Mexico during this time (Valenzuela, 2016). 
Pena Nieto continued the tone that was created by Calderon by 
promising to minimize the death rate. He created a national police force that 
was to be trained by the US with counter insurgency tactics. Named the 
Gendarmarie, the 40,000 strong paramilitary force was designed to take on 
the kingpin strategy and meant to eradicate the drug war in Mexico. This 
strategy was a continuation of that of Calderon’s, but in a repackaged form. 
Pena Nieto with his creation of the new paramilitary force also received 
accusations that the new internal security law that he had put in place was 
violating human rights and there was a lack of protection towards news 
journalism as well as the use of Pegasus software to spy on them. The Law 
of Internal Security was endangering citizens as it essentially gave the 
military a blank check. They or the President were able to attack any group 
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which they considered to be a danger or threat to them, without the need for 
justification (Graham, 2012; Ahmed, 2017; Corcoran, 2012). The CNDH 
had put out many reports about Pena Nietos internal law of security and the 
potential for human rights abuses, due to the overwhelming favouritism of 
the discretional use of the military in its interpretation (Daly, Heinle & 
Shirk, 2012). 
Conclusion: 
 Mexico’s successive presidencies and their policies had a significant 
impact on the handling of the Zapatistas and the Chiapas uprising. From 
Salinas and Zedillo through to Pena Nieto, all the presidents had significant 
other issues that played a role in the treatment of the Zapatistas. There was 
the presence of NAFTA, the reluctance engagement due to the international 
condemnation, and need for political stability. The Peso crisis and 
international bailout where similar factors of international condemnation 
and political stability took to the fore. PPP and other plans for economic 
development around Chiapas needed the treatment of the Zapatista to be 
different. This also coincided with the growing significance and impact of 
the war on drugs and the rising violence that, that had brought. The 
presidencies also had significant issues that overshadowed the Zapatistas 
during their times. Their priorities were elsewhere and the lack of definitive 
policies relating to the Zapatistas being pursued by the presidencies 
reflected this. There was also the international condemnation that they 
received when they did act against the Zapatistas and the significant 
influence that the United States had on Mexico’s politics that played an 





J Harry Wray in Sense and Non-Sense (2000) argued that every country has 
a political culture that is defined by their shared values, norms and belief 
systems. The shared beliefs define the relationship between the government 
and the citizens. Countries have different types of ideologies and will adapt 
or alter depending on the beliefs or values that the country holds (Wray, 
2000).  
Robert Putnam (1971) argued that “elite political culture” may be 
defined as the set of politically relevant beliefs, values and habits of the 
most highly involved members in the political system. The political culture 
that you’re influenced by, influences your political style the decision 
making and subsequent thought processes that you go through. Culture has a 
powerful influence on people’s behaviours and thoughts, particularly 
involving interaction between groups and resolving conflicts or 
disagreement (Putnam, 1971).  
Culture can be used to view observable political effects. Culture in 
this sense is used as a casual or explanatory variable. According to Asad, 
(1993) an empirically grounded, practice-oriented approach to culture can 
help to explain how political identifications are established. Rhetoric and 
symbols not only exemplify but can ultimately have the power to produce 
political compliance and or affect political outcomes (Asad, 1993). Lisa 
Wedeen (2002) argued that even at a minimum, studying or exploring 
culture by identifying practices has developed into the ability to 
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understanding or politics and decisions the made. Martha Finnemore (1996) 
in Norms, Culture and World Politics argued that sociological 
institutionalism challenges dominant ideas in international relations. This 
idea provides a system of framework in which to analyse both international 
and domestic politics. The idea generates testable hypothesis about 
international behaviour and the power that culture has on politics. 
Mexico has a strong affinity towards masks, playing a significant 
role both spiritually and culturally. There has been numerous amounts of 
work published on the symbolism and use of these masks in Mexican 
culture. However, not a great deal has been published on the Zapatistas use 
of their masks and the affect it may have had on the treatment they received 
during their rebellion against the Mexican government. This chapter 
explores the use of masks in Mexican culture and discusses if this could 
have had an effect on the governments’ psyche and how they dealt with the 
Zapatistas.  
Labyrinth of Solitude: 
A key piece of work within this frame of political culture is The 
Labyrinth of Solitude by Octavio Paz, (1961) particularly the chapter on the 
Mexican Mask. The themes that run through the work are that solitude is 
responsible for the Mexican perspectives on death, fiesta and identity. He 
stated the Mexican is made up of two distinct cultures and identities, the 
Indigenous and the Spaniard. However, in denying one part of their identity, 
they become stuck in a world of solitude. The true Mexican is usually 
hidden behind a mask (Paz, 1961). Throughout his work, Paz described the 
Spanish influence and views of society that have passed onto the Mexican 
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psyche. Something quite poignant and relevant was the views of woman that 
Paz describes, particularly due to the fact the Zapatistas’ rebellion was full 
of young girls. He said, “Woman should be secretive, an impassive smile”, 
and a “woman’s place is in the home, with a broken leg.”(Paz, 1961, p.36) 
The Mexican considers the woman to be dark, secretive and passive, does 
not attribute evil instincts to her, and pretends she has none. It is impossible 
for her to have a personal or private life, for if she was to be herself, she 
would be a mistress to her own wishes, passions or whims, and she would 
be unfaithful to herself. It is believed that the Mexican woman quite simply 
has no will of her own and only comes alive when someone wakes her (Paz, 
1961). These are all statements from Paz that showed the underlying 
feelings towards a Mexican Woman.  
The Mexican Mask: 
The mask has a powerful use in this regard. It allows women to 
break free from the views that exist in society and allows them to be their 
true selves. They are no longer denying one part of their identity and have 
the ability to free themselves from the dominant thought. The mask, in this 
respect allows for a form of self-defence. (Paz, 1961) This can be seen as 
both dangerous and empowering by those who are not masked. For the 
government, the Zapatista Women are no longer bound by the social 
constraints that exist and are able to freely express themselves. They were 
no longer hiding behind the face of solitude. Their true selves were able to 
be expressed. Looking deeper into the Mexican psyche, Mexican people 
inherently view the world around them as dangerous. Hostility of their 
environment and their history teach them to protect themselves. They are 
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afraid of expressing their true selves. Masks serve as a form of defence 
while at the same time providing separation from the harsh realities that 
they were facing (Paz, 1961). Their masks allowed the Zapatistas to be their 
true self, not what they were being classed as in society, the poor indigenous 
farmers. As the Zapatistas wore masks, it gave them power or an aura as 
they were being able to be their true self. Managing to escape the face of 
solitude that the majority of Mexico was still hiding behind.  
Thomas Nail (2013) in his article, The Politics of the Mask, looked 
at this in another aspect, and links it to other masked movements throughout 
history. The most common argument is that masks bring about a 
faceless/non hierarchal movement where members can’t be targeted based 
upon rank or significance (Nail, 2013). Masks reject the political 
representation of the party and the state. Throughout history, the goal of 
social movements was to publicly demonstrate the power and identity of a 
group, communicating ‘we are x, we are here.’ The wearing of the masks 
make a statement against the corruption and misrepresentation of the state 
and the system that the Zapatistas believed to have been committed. Masks 
made a symbolic and practical rejection of individual identities that parties 
and states require to ‘represent’ their members. The Zapatistas, with their 
use of masks, are working outside of the traditional framework and creating 
new lines of representation. Were the Mexican authorities prepared to deal 
with this new form of representation? Is this why the Zapatistas were dealt 
with differently? 
Masks create political universalism, because anyone can be a 
Zapatistas by donning the mask. This may have been hard for the PRI, as 
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the person in their sights might not have just been that peasant farmer from 
Chiapas any longer. Masks also undermine hierarchy and authoritarianism 
by elimination markers of authority (Nial, 2013). This ruled out the ability 
to effectively target and eliminate leaders or high ranking members of the 
Zapatistas, a method that had been used effectively before by the PRI during 
their tenure in power. The use of masks also played into the preferential 
treatment of elites by the PRI, they could no longer tell who was an 
indigenous peasant and who could be a member of the elite. Alex 
Khasnabish (2010) in his work Rebellion from the Grassroots, provided an 
analysis on the Zapatistas’ use of Masks. He wroye that Marcos and the 
Zapatistas used masks for two specific reasons.  
The primary one is that we have to watch out for protagonism-in 
other words, that people do not promote themselves too much. It is 
about being anonymous, so that they can’t corrupt us… we know our 
leadership is collective. Even though you are listening to me now, 
because I’m here in another place, masked the same way others are 
talking. This person today is called Marcos and tomorrow will be 
called Pedro in Margaritas or Jose in Oscingo or Alfredo in 
Altamirano. Finally the one who speaks is a more collective heart. 
Not a cauillidior. And the time will come when the people will 
realise that it is enough to have dignity and put on a mask and say 
well than I can do this too (Khasnabish, 2010, p. 209-210). 
The masked faces of the Zapatistas were also meant to evoke the states of 
indigenous peoples in Mexico. By masking themselves, the Zapatistas 
became faceless, anonymous and without identity. The denial of dignity and 
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all consequences that flow from that, had been a long characteristic of the 
fate imposed upon indigenous people since the invasion of the Americas. 
Faceless and without dignity, people became fodder for those in power. But 
in taking up masks voluntarily, the Zapatistas reclaimed the stolen dignity 
and reminded everyone that the most marginalised, invisible and oppressed 
had the power to remake the world (Khasnabish, 2010, p. 212). Crucial to 
the Zapatistas’ response was their use of symbolic violence. The masks gave 
the Zapatistas a symbolic appearance as an ‘army of the other’ giving them 
the ubiquity and an unlimited presence declaring their complete infiltration 
of the territory (Conant, 2010, p. 156). 
Most People are Other People: (Wilde, 1905) 
We are influenced to an amazing extent by people with whom we 
identify. A fostered sense of identity with one group of people can be made 
into a powerful weapon to brutalize another. The art of constructing hatred 
takes the form of invoking the magical power of some allegedly 
predominant identity that drowns other affiliations (Sen, 2007; Slocum-
Bradley, 2008). The major source of potential conflict in the contemporary 
world is the presumption that people can be uniquely categorised based on 
the identity. So, conversely, the lack of this identity makes it difficult to 
construct the hatred or the ability that it takes to build a specific target. The 
masks of the Zapatistas create this lack of identity. True, it does create a 
new class of masked people that can become targeted, but the difficulty is 
what lies under the mask, one can’t tell who is really under it. The magical 
power of the alleged predominant identity is hard to follow if the identity is 
not a clear, cut one. Identity can kill and kill with abandon. A strong and 
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exclusive sense of belonging to one group or differentiation from another 
becomes a dangerous one. Violence is fronted by the imposition of singular 
and belligerent identities, championed by proficient artisans of terror. The 
work on social capital by Robert Putnam explored the power on how 
identity in a community has so much power on the lives of those affected, 
whether that’s being positive or negative (Putnam, 2001). Violence is 
associated with identity and is replicated the world over. Students in 
Tlatelolco in 1968 were easily targeted, as they all fitted a specific identity. 
Teachers in Guvero, again were easily targeted. Was it really the lack of a 
visible identity that led to the Zapatistas different treatment?  
Gary H, Gossen in his 1996 article Maya Zapatistas Move to the 
Ancient Future argued that Mayan culture in an essence, and places large 
importance on anonymity and secrecy that the Zapatistas use of masks is 
portraying. That the use of masks by the Zapatistas is activating something 
that is deep within the psyche of the Mayan culture (Gossen, 1996). He 
quoted an Indian writer Rigoberta Merchu, who said: 
We Indians have always hidden our identity and kept our secrets to 
ourselves. This is why we are discriminated against. We often find it 
hard to talk about ourselves because we know we must hide so much 
in order to preserve our Indian culture and prevent it from being 
taken away from us. (Gossen, 1996, p.534) 
Mayan Cognitive Baggage: 
Gossen subsequently argued that the Mayan people carry “cognitive 
baggage in their languages, minds, hearts and soul” (Gossen, 2013, p.258) 
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and that the use of the Masks takes this baggage away and lets them truly be 
free (Gossen, 2013). This point takes on that Paz was referring to in his 
writings from the Labyrinth of Solitude. The masking incognito mode of 
self-representation of the Zapatistas appears to be linked to the construction 
on the Mayan self and society. It cannot be passed off simply as Guerrilla 
theatre nor as simply as a security measure. Gossen argued that it is in fact a 
logical strategy of caution and modesty in the arena of instrumentality 
where the goals are not yet achieved and the benefit of the community has 
no yet manifested itself (Gossen, 2013). For the presence of the self, it is 
best for the individual to be ritually homogenized through the use of the 
masks. Gossen added that this idea folds itself deep into the matrix of 
ancient Meso-American ideas about the self and society (Gossen, 2013). For 
Patricia Montilla, the masks appealed to an ancient tradition of symbolic 
power (the symbolic function of the mask is the same as the primal animal 
disguise) individual human expression is submerged, in its place the wearer 
assumes the dignity and the beauty of the animal demon (Montilla, 2013). 
When we look at someone we study them and their features through 
the lens that society has setup or that we have subscribed to. The Mexican 
mask represents the absence or lack of ability to do this. The Mask 
represents a collective psyche that ultimately conceals the self from the lens 
that is normally used to deconstruct someone. Masks conceal identity and 
liberate the wearer from socially constructed views. Bakhtin argued that the 
Mexican Mask is “one of the most complex elements” (Montilla, 2013, p. 
360) of Mexican culture, which negates unitary conceptions of the self and 
allows change and reincarnation. “Masks can be seen as a source of power 
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that give the wearer and the culture the strength to prevail against inherent 
struggles of life” (Montilla, 2013, p. 360). Something that does create a 
point of discussion is the use of ski masks by the authorities. There is 
significant evidence that shows the Mexican military and police wore masks 
when executing orders against cartels, criminals and rebel groups (Malkin, 
2009; González, 2010; Meyer, 2014). Would this then negate the effect the 
masks if both sides were using them? As the Mexican authorities were using 
the masks for protection from being identified, would this have not allowed 
them the same power that the Zapatistas gained from using the masks? 
Conclusion: 
In conclusion and to answer the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, the use of masks helped the Zapatistas in being treated differently 
from every other group who engaged in open rebellion with the Mexican 
Government. From the scholarship on the Zapatistas and masks it is difficult 
to find any evidence that suggests the masks played a significant or defining 
role in the treatment of the Zapatistas, any more than if they used masks in 
any other culture or society. There is something deeper, which has yet to be 
accurately described about the masks, Mexican society and culture and the 
power that surrounds them. But for the purpose of this thesis, the masks did 
not play any significant part to answering the fundamental question. 
Something that also may have negated the hypotheses posed on the masks 
was that fact that the military and police used ski masks for much of the 
same reason that the Zapatistas were using theirs. This could have negated 




Corruption in Mexico: 
Stephen D Morris (2009) argued that corruption pervaded the 
Mexican political system, where it endures as an institutionalized part of the 
political system as well as a part of everyday life. Thanks to this and the 
nature of Mexico’s political system, Mexico has had a long history of 
political corruption (Morris, 2009). Scott Stewart (2011) argued that 
Mexico’s corruption goes far deeper than just the corrupt government 
institutions, that the corruption is just a symptom of deeper, systematic and 
cultural problems (Stewart, 2011). There was a legacy of institutionalised 
PRI corruption that had existed in Mexico and that there were still the 
possibility for this to continue in the post PRI governments (Morris, 1999; 
Shelley, 2001). A history of limited respect for the law and state structures 
that existed among the elites across Mexico. Various sources all argued that 
there is rampant corruption across Mexico and a strong system of 
clientelism that exists (Karcz, 2017; Johnston, 1997; Green &Ward, 2004). 
Ward and Green (2004) continued that, due to clientelism corruption and 
violence go hand in hand and will occur together. Karez (2017) argued that 
Mexico had a system of grand corruption in which there is a causal link 
between grand corruption and state terror, in which powerful public officials 
collude with paramilitary groups or criminal groups for their private interest, 
leading to state terror. Mexico’s corruption was duly noted with the 
dominance of the PRI governments including Salinas and Zedillo and there 
was evidence of it being present in the PAN governments especially that of 
Calderon’s (Karcz, 2017). In Mexico, the players change every six years, 
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while the high level of corruption continues (Lupsha, 1991). Calderon’s 
drug fight was rigged and there was favouritism and corruption involving 
certain cartels, that being the Sinaloa Cartel. Dozens of high level cartel 
operators were killed or captured while the leadership of this cartel had been 
untouched. (Beittel, 2011; Morris, 2012; Beith, 2011) The cartel had a long 
history of protection and collusion with authorities that go back to the early 
PRI days (Beith, 2011; Krzeski, 2013). There have since been arrests of this 
cartel, but not on the scale or effectiveness of the others.  Corruption in 
Mexico has permeated several segments in society. Political, economic and 
social and has greatly affected the countries legitimacy, transparent, 
accountability and effectiveness. The corruption has evolved due to the 
legacy of elite, oligarchic consolidation of power and authoritarian rule that 
has persisted in Mexico for decades. Mexico has the environment in which 
corruption thrives to such an extent that “corruption is not a disagreeable 
characteristic of the Mexican political system: it is the system.” (Grasso, 
2017, p.1; Shirk, 2012; Zaid, 1987) 
Inequality in Mexico: 
Mexico is an unequal society and as with most of Latin America has 
a vicious cycle of inequality (Hernandez, 2015; Karl, 2002). Under the PRI, 
Mexico was run as a criminal state, and 
 one where much, if not most, state activity has been privatized 
where either those in power or those with leverage over those in 
power use state agency to advance their private interest at the 
expense of public good (Rosas, 2018, p. 56) 
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When the PRI lost power in 2000 the inequality and corruption of the 
government decentralized and diversified, but never disappeared (Rosas, 
2018). 
Racism in Mexican society is a contributor to the inequality and 
unequal aspects of Mexican society. In Mexico there exists a deep seeded 
racist logic that has emerged from the experiences from historical 
development. While developing a political ideology and complex 
configuration of the Mexican identity due to Spanish influence during the 
birth trauma of Mexico (Moreno, 2010; Zizumbo-Colunga & Martínez, 
2017). Whiteness is seen as legitimacy and privilege. Recent studies have 
shown that there is significant racial inequality in Mexico. Darker skin is 
strongly associated with decreased wealth and less schooling. The studies 
argued that race is the single most important determinant of a Mexican 
citizen’s economic and educational attainment and consequently their place 
in society’s hierarchy (Moreno, 2010; Zizumbo-Colunga & Martínez, 2017). 
These determinants and logic exist across generations of Mexicans. Light 
skin fall into highest wealth, longest life expectancy, schooling attainment, 
influence on society etc. the racism in Mexico significantly impacts the 
indigenous communities and the mixed race communities. Chiapas, the 
home state of the Zapatistas, has 13.5% of Mexico’s indigenous population. 
The Zapatistas themselves are largely made up of poor rural indigenous 
people. Mexico and Latin America have a vicious cycle of inequality 
(Rosas, 2018; Karl, 2002). This inequality is based upon endowments of 
wealth and or family connections, it is argued that these inequalities affect 
prospects for growth and shape political and social life. The concentration 
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of political and economic power is from a legacy of colonialism. Mexico as 
with much of Latin America have had a hierarchical political structure based 
upon executive dominance, weak rule of law and excessive militarism. The 
inequalities that were established by the centralization of power provide the 
basis for exclusionary authoritarian regimes. Where the influence of giant, 
domestic family based groups distort political decisions. These inequalities 
and the way there are created are self-reinforcing patterns (Villarreal, 2014; 
Karl, 2002)( Bruno, Ravallion & Squire, 1998). 
Mexico is an unequal society (Fox, 2011; Hernandez, 2015; Esquivel 
& Cruces, 2011). Corruption and inequality coexist in a vicious cycle that 
disproportionately affects the poor (Karl, 2002; Rosas, 2018). This cycle can 
weaken states capacity, destabilize governance and empower populist, 
criminal or alternative structures. These issues have long pervaded Mexico. 
There is vast inequalities across Mexico, Mexico falls into the top 25% of 
inequality for countries in the world. Between the years of 1984-2014, 
Mexico has had a Gini Coefficient average of 49, with a max level of 51.7 
and a low of 46. The average around the world sits at 37.3. The same studies 
argued that this Gini Coefficient demonstrates that inequality is playing a 
significant role in the increasing violence across Mexico, as the coefficient 
has been increasing as Mexico’s levels of violence have been increasing 
with direct correlation (Enamorado, Lopez-Calva , Luis-Felipe; Rodriguez-





Internal colonialism is a notion of structural political and economic 
inequalities within a state. Uneven and combined development, rejection of 
the idea that human society developed through a uni linear sequence of 
stages (Gutiérrez, 2004; Hind, 1984; Frank, 2018). Chiapas as a state has 
been involved in a legacy of internal colonialism, which has encouraged the 
federal government to treat the region as an extractive zone, while still 
remaining the least electrified, schooled and literate state in the country and 
among the poorest (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). Any effort 
politically that has been made to improve the situation in Chiapas have 
either been overridden by the local elites or been overlooked by federal 
government. (Ruiz, 1993; Russell, 1995; Harvey, 1998; Prassad, 2003). 
Chiapas has played a strategic role for Mexico in the relationship with the 
United States and the presence and effects of internal colonialism are felt 
across the state (Castillo, 2006; Weinberg, 2000; Casanova, 1963). Going 
back to the early periods of Chiapas being a state in Mexico, the Indians in 
Chiapas lost their land, were forced to work for outsiders and became 
politically dominated. These relationships were a “function of the structural 
development underdevelopment dichotomy” (Stavenhagen, 1970, p. 277) 
that existed within Mexico. Chiapas and the Indians in the region would 
persist as a form of cheap, disposable labour (Stavenhagen, 1970; Gutierrez, 
2004). 
Elite Leadership: 
Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vicente, Subcomandante Marcos. El Sub, 
Delegate Zero. Known by numerous names, the leader and spokesman of 
82 
 
the Zapatistas was a former University professor from the University of 
Autonomous Metropolitan University, with a masters and bachelor’s degree 
from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. From a self-described 
middle class family from Tampico, Tamaulipo Mexico son of an elementary 
school teacher and a store owner, Marcos is a world apart from the other 
members of the Zapatistas (Henck, 2007; Camp, 2011). His sister is 
Mercedes del Carmen Guillen Vincente who is the attorney general of the 
state of Tamaulipo and an influential member of the PRI (Khasnabish, 2003; 
Carreron, 2001; EZLN, 2001; Camp, 2011). The Guillen Vicente family is 
from the right side of Mexico’s inequality divide, with significant 
connections to those in power. The family ties that Marcos has though his 
sister and the vast history Mexico has of corruption and inequality affecting 
political decisions could have had its part to play with the Mexican 
authority’s treatment of the Zapatistas. Marcos was the face and figurehead 
of the Zapatistas movement. He was their spokesman and of the right colour 
and ethnicity in regards to the perceived racism that exists in Mexico. He is 
well educated, well-spoken comes from a stable economic base and has 
good family ties. In comparison to other rebellions during this time in 
Mexico, this was a stark contrast to the norm. The spokesman of the 
Zapatistas looked like a member of the Mexican elite, spoke like one, came 
from family like one and had ties to members of the dominant party of the 
time. There is a strong history in Mexico of corruption and influencing 
political decisions, groups or individuals receiving preferential treatment or 
having a blind eye turned on them. This was a contrast to other rebellions in 
Mexico that were brutally repressed by the Mexican authorities. The Party 
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of the Poor for comparison with the Zapatistas was founded in 1967 in 
Guerrero, Mexico. This group was led by a rural school teacher and union 
member Lucio Cabanas, who didn’t have the connections with the elite nor 
was a member of the elite himself (Marley, 2008; Bornemann, Schmidt & 
De Schmidt, 2007). This group was brutally repressed by Mexican 
authorities. The People’s Guerrilla Group was another group that was 
brutally repressed by the Mexican authorities. The group’s leadership was 
comprised of teachers, students and peasants, with no link to the Mexican 
elites. Little is known of the People’s Revolutionary Army and their 
leadership, however those who have been speculated have no ties to elites in 
Mexico (Marley, 2008; Bornemann, Schmidt & De Schmidt, 2007). 
A number of different scholars in Mexican politics emphasized the 
political power of local elites (Khasnabish, 2003; Carreron, 2001). In 
Mexico, the local elites of various states have significant political power, 
this continues along the theme of corruption and preferential treatment elites 
gain. However it also highlights the reforms that successive PRI presidents 
had put in place, most notably Miguel de la Madrid followed by Salinas and 
Zedillo. When Madrid took office, he demanded that the policies that 
needed the most attention and reform was decentralization of the economic 
and political systems. A strong emphasis was placed on the necessity to 
reduce the patterns of concentration of Mexico City power, and towards a 
system of distribution of political and economic power being balanced 
across the country and levels of government (Rodriguez 1992; Rodriguez 
1993; Nickson 1995; Hiskey 2000). Madrid’s reforms expanded the 
responsibilities of local elites across Mexico. The local elites took advantage 
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of the decentralization to gain more political and economic power and 
exercise impunity and corruption without federal control. This increase in 
local political power links in with Chiapas predisposition to use local militia 
to assert control (Nieto 2011; Yves 1992; Rodriguez 1993). Would it have 
also had significant impact on the Mexican Militaries lack of engagement in 
the region? 
Conclusion: 
 Mexico is an unequal and corrupt society, with vast and complex 
inequalities and racism against the poor and indigenous the Zapatistas fall 
into both groups. However the overall treatment the Zapatistas received 
goes against the way these groups have been traditionally treated. 
Corruption in Mexico is built into the system and has been a part of the 
political culture for many years. Due to this corruption, there exists a 
preferential treatment of elites, which could have included the Zapatistas 
rebellion as there are signs that point to Marcos having the potential to being 
classed as an elite, or at least having family connections that would generate 





This thesis has examined what caused the Zapatistas 1994 rebellion 
to be treated differently from all others in Mexico’s history. A range of 
hypotheses that covered different and interlinking areas in an effort to 
formulate an answer, or at least to create more discourse on the topic. As 
was mentioned throughout the thesis, the way the Mexican government and 
military reacted and handled the rebellion was uncharacteristic. Throughout 
their history, the Mexican authorities have typically chosen to brutally 
repress anybody who spoke out, demonstrated, or rebelled against them, and 
refused to go into peace talks with them, which makes the Zapatists are a 
unique case. 
H1:   The Zapatistas and Subcomandante Marcos’ use of the internet 
and media have had a significant impact on their ability to survive the 
Mexican authorities. 
The Zapatistas use of the internet and media does appear to have had 
a significant impact on their ability to survive the Mexican authorities. 
Communication is crucial across politics and politics determines who gets 
what, when and how. “Liberation technology” and the ability it provides for 
dissemination of information was crucial in this respect especially that the 
Zapatistas was a grassroots struggle. The Zapatistas were able to efficiently 
put their voice and message out to the global community, something that 
other groups struggled to or never got that chance to effectively do. The PRI 
relied heavily on the suppression and the ability to work without outside 
influential judgement. The Zapatistas ability to disseminate their message 
across many different mediums and platforms, allowed them to break this 
suppression. Many authors such as Khasnabish (2008, 2010) who had 
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written on the Zapatistas rebellion have argued that it was the ability to 
disseminate their message and not succumb to the suppression that was the 
strength behind the Zapatistas success.  
H2: The internet presence of the Zapatistas have had a significant effect 
on the exercise of restraint by the Mexican authorities. 
This hypothesis links to a similar conclusion of the previous one. 
The presence online of the Zapatistas only helped to further the case, and 
the internet and media played a significant impact on the treatment of the 
Zapatistas. The internet allowed the Zapatistas to remain relevant and their 
content kept being disseminated. Without this constant presence on the 
internet, the Zapatistas would have struggled to keep the notion of 
“liberation technology” and communication strong. 
H4: The Mexican Government has shown a lack of interest in Chiapas. 
The lack of interest hypothesis is a little harder to answer. Though 
there is significant evidence to suggest that the PRI wasn’t aware or 
interested in the Zapatistas in the lead up to the rebellion, or a Chiapas as a 
state, it’s difficult to unanimously state that this had an overall impact on the 
treatment of the Zapatistas. There was still significant repression in the 
neighbouring state of Guerrero, which is just as poor and ‘backward’ as 
Chiapas, but did experience the brutal repression from the Mexican 
authorities. There was no evidence that there was significant knowledge on 
the students in Tlatelolco, and they were brutally repressed. This hypothesis 
does raise an interesting and possibly significant question, that of the 
preparedness of the PRI and Military. As Doyle (2003, 2004, 2009) in her 
work shows, there was significant lack of knowledge of the Zapatistas and 
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lack of preparedness on behalf of the government and military in the initial 
period of the Zapatistas rebellion. If both groups were prepared for the 
rebellion, and had the required knowledge and preparedness, would the 
actions taken still have been the same?  
H3: The historical period of the Zapatista rebellion is a crucial causal 
factor in the restraint exercised by the Mexican authorities.  
H6: The Salinas and Zedillo governments did not want international 
condemnation from the repression of another group. 
These hypotheses both link significantly with each other due to the 
NAFTA deal and later on the Peso Crisis, and affect how the Zapatistas 
were ultimately treated. As Salinas and his PRI Government had placed so 
much importance on the NAFTA deal to continue the neo-liberal economic 
plan they had set out, they didn’t want anything to impede the success. This 
meant no condemnation from the USA or the international community, nor 
the risk of fighting an internal rebellion that could impact the internal 
political stability of Mexico. If the rebellion occurred years before or after 
NAFTA’s commencement date, the outcome for the Zapatistas may have 
been very different. The pressures from outside influences that Salinas and 
Zedillo faced about their human rights record would not have been 
anywhere near as strong. Salina’s shuffled his cabinet to put in place people 
with human rights leanings and negotiation experiences, and removed 
people who had been involved with repression. Zedillo also faced 
significant pressure from the USA and international community after the 
bailout his government received following the Peso Crisis. The Zapatistas 
took advantage of the timing of these events, the lack of manoeuvrability the 
Mexican government had, and entered into negotiation and peace talks. The 
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timing of the NAFTA deal and the Zapatistas also ties into H0 and H1 as 
there was significant social networks around the world that were already 
anti NAFTA and neo liberal agendas, which the Zapatistas signified and 
gained support from. 
H5: The Zapatistas’ use of masks triggered a cultural sensitivity that 
appears to have affected the Mexican Government and military. 
Though there is significant scholarship written on and about 
Mexican culture and the use of masks and the significance they provide, it is 
hard to quantify the relevant impact that the masks had on the treatment of 
the Zapatistas. If the students in 1968 had been wearing masks would their 
treatment have been different? There could have been something behind the 
Zapatistas use of masks and the different treatment they received. It is just 
hard to quantify in regards to this thesis. Mexican Federales and military 
also wear ski masks just like the ones that the Zapatistas use, this could have 
negated any affect that the power of the masks might have created. If both 
sides were using masks in a similar way, the cultural effect could have been 
effectively negated. 
H7: The Zapatistas were treated differently because of Mexico’s 
preferential treatment of elites. 
Significant work has been published on the point that Mexico does 
have preferential treatment of elites and certain groups. There is vast and 
deep corruption in Mexico. It is not an equal society and groups and certain 
people do get treated differently due to their connections, or simply bribery. 
On the part that the Zapatistas were treated differently due to the 
preferential treatment of elites it is not clear cut. It is true that Marcos’s 
sister is a member of the PRI, though it is not openly known how much of a 
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relationship they have. There also still exists some debate on Marcos’s 
identity. He has never formally recognised himself as being Guillen 
Vicente, which would impact significantly on this hypothesis. However, 
despite all this there still exists significant corruption and preferential 
treatment across Mexico. This in itself leaves the plausibility of this 
question still open, though there would need to be more research into the 
elite status of Marcos and his family ties.  
H8: The Zapatistas were a low priority for the Mexican Governments 
following the 1994 uprising. 
Like in some of the previous hypotheses, after the 1994 uprising the 
Zapatistas were a low priority for the Mexican Government. Salinas was 
focused on the NAFTA deal. Though he was concerned with the Zapatistas 
during his period, NAFTA was his priority and his actions reflected this. 
Zedillo was similar to Salinas in that the Zapatistas did rank in significance, 
but there were major issues like that of the Peso Crisis that took precedence 
and the political concessions that were made following it. Fox and Calderon 
were more focused on economic development and the rising violence of the 
drug wars that were taking place. Pena Nieto could also be classified into 
this group, as economic development and the War on Drugs were at the 
forefront of his priorities. These three presidents never had overt policies 
regarding the Zapatistas and during their respective tenures the Zapatistas 
were slowly becoming politically irrelevant. This hypothesis does hold 
some validity to it, post 1994 the successive governments had their priorities 
elsewhere, the Zapatistas themselves were also slowly becoming politically 
irrelevant as time passed. The ability for the Zapatistas to survive the initial 
1994 uprising went a long way to them surviving.  
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This thesis addressed Mexico’s reluctance to repress a dissident 
group of poor indigenous farmers from Chiapas. This was a unique event in 
the Mexican context due to an obvious precedent that had been set by the 
Mexican authorities over a number of years. This question has bigger 
implication in the Mexican context, the reluctance on behalf the Mexican 
government highlighted the limitations within and across the Mexican 
government and authorities. The Zapatista rebellion has had an impact on 
civil-military relations across Mexico. It has highlighted international and 
domestic attention towards indigenous rights, recognition and self-
determination. This alone is something that could have a significant impact 
in years to come. The Zapatistas and international communities’ use of the 
internet as a liberating medium, and as a tool of protest is another significant 
implication to arise from the Zapatista rebellion. This area is rich as it’s only 
growing and becoming more assessable. The Zapatista effect, rise of an 
alternative political fabric and the growing power of grassroots social 
movements has influenced movements in North America like that of the 
occupy movement and other anti-capitalist and globalization movements. 
The Zapatista have inspired people from around the world, but their success 
in surviving repression in Mexico was highly context-dependent and thus 
not readily replicable by rebel groups in other countries. The Zapatista 
rebellion is thus a source of inspiration, but not a practical model that could 
be emulated by others around the world. Movements have replicated signs, 
slogans and insignia from the Zapatistas, the inspiration of the Zapatistas is 
clear, their methods are not directly correlated however. The Zapatistas 
movement has facilitated a discussion on the use of the internet, grassroots 
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movements and the fabric of politics and the political sphere. This has all 
occurred during a time when the existing political, social and economic 
order is facing new challenges from the power social media and “liberation 
technology” is providing, with the Zapatista movement being just one 
example of what can occur. 
This plausibility probe case study on the Zapatistas allowed for the 
probing of potential theories to find the potential validity of them and if they 
were worth developing further. The use of the plausibility probe was useful 
as it has been used as a setup for a more intense case study with the room 
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